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A. Three calamities 
It is September, 2008, and though my hands tap out this introduction from a coffee shop in 
suburban Lansing, Michigan, my mind is elsewhere. 
In New Orleans and in the other towns and cities of the American Gulf Coast, some two 
million people are now returning to homes they evacuated days ago, before Hurricane Gustav hit. 
Thanks to their foresight, a newly fortified set of levees, and a proactive, coordinated 
governmental response, this particular hurricane has killed few Americans.1 But in the wider 
Caribbean, the storm’s impacts have been more serious: before striking the Gulf Coast, Gustav 
killed 97 people in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, southern Florida, Haiti, and Jamaica, 
destroying or damaging some 90,000 houses in Cuba alone.2
 In the villages of Bihar State, eastern India, nearly two and a half million people are now 
refugees. Eighteen days ago, monsoon rains—the region’s heaviest in least 50 years—changed 
the course of the Kosi River, bursting a dam in neighboring Nepal. The resulting floodwaters 
have inundated nearly 1,000 small villages, stranding residents in the surrounding hills and 
treetops without food or clean water. 117 are confirmed dead, but the figure will surely rise as 
naval divers uncover bodies and water-borne illnesses spread.3
 In the Darfur region of western Sudan and eastern Chad, as in Bihar State, two and a half 
million people have also been displaced. Their exile has lasted longer than that of either the Gulf 
                                                 
1 As of September 2, 2008, seven people are reported to have died as a consequence of the storm. Hurricane Katrina, 
by comparison, killed 1,836. Patrik Jonsson, “How New Orleans weathered Gustav,” Christian Science Monitor, 
September 3, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0903/p10s01-usgn.html. 




3 Rama Lakshmi, “’River of Sorrow’ Floods Affecting Millions in India,” Washington Post, September 2, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/02/AR2008090201419.html. 
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Coast Americans or the Bihar State Indians previously mentioned, however, and its causes are 
more varied and complex than any single biophysical impact. In the late 1980s, a major drought 
struck Ethiopia and Sudan, sparking one of history’s deadliest famines and, subsequently, a 
contest for Sudan’s scarce arable land among the country’s diverse ethnic groups.4 For the past 
twenty years, Arab militias known as Janjaweed have waged a slow genocide—replete with mass 
killings, rapes, and, since about 2004, government-assisted aerial bombings5—against the 
primarily black, non-Arab farming communities of Darfur, in an apparent effort to expropriate 
their land and livestock. Indeed, a black Djiba tribesman who was driven from his village by the 
Janjaweed in 2004 recalls being told by “some Arabs in the region:” “’We’re going to send you 
blacks away and claim this land for ourselves’.”6 7 Sustained water and crop shortages have 
accompanied and exacerbated the conflict; the Sudanese government’s failure to help black 
Darfurians cope with these difficulties was among the reasons that drove the Sudanese 
Liberation Army and other resistance groups to attack government outposts in 2003. 8  These 
actions prompted a greatly intensified series of Janjaweed raids and aerial bombings, which have 
resulted in the deaths of approximately 300,000 people since they began in 2003.9  
 Climate science advises us not to attribute particular natural events like Hurricane 
Gustav, or the Kosi River floods, or desertification in Darfur to climate change, given the tangle 
                                                 
4 Patrick Webb, Joachim von Braun, and Tesfaye Teklu, “Drought and Famine in Ethiopia and Sudan: An Ongoing 
Tragedy,” Natural Hazards, 4, 1991, pp. 85-86. 
5 Jeevan Vasagar, “Hunted by death squads, a people without hope,” Salon.com, August 24, 2004, 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/08/24/guardian_sudan_death_squads/index.html. 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Janjaweed’s scorched-earth tactics—which have included poisoning wells with corpses and burning prime 
farmland—are most simply understood within the context of a wider campaign to permanently remove black 
Darfurians from their land. Physicians for Human Rights staff, Assault on Survival: A Call for Security, Justice, and 
Restitution, January 11, 2006, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/darfur-assault-on-
survival.pdf. 
8 Josh Braun, “A Hostile Climate: Did Global Warming Cause a Resource War in Darfur?”, SEED Magazine, 
August 2, 2006, http://seedmagazine.com/news/2006/08/a_hostile_climate.php. 
9 CBC News staff, “Darfur death toll could be as high as 300,000: UN official,” CBC.ca, April 22, 2008, 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/04/22/darfur-un.html.  
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of physical factors that causes them. But science does admit of statements about “the likelihood 
of certain types of extreme events,” which may be used in coordination with careful statistical 
analyses to estimate the extent to which greenhouse gases generally affect these types of 
events.10 In this way, climate models have linked rising atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations with stronger, more destructive hurricanes11 and monsoons12 and more frequent 
droughts and rain pattern disruptions.13 These concentrations have indeed risen, at historically 
unprecedented rates: since the Industrial Revolution began, the atmosphere’s carbon dioxide 
content has increased from 280 parts per million to about 380 parts per million, with 
corresponding observed increases in radiative forcing (that is, the extent to which a greenhouse 
gas adds to the atmosphere’s net energy balance).14
We can conclude without controversy that, somewhere in the catastrophes now afflicting 
the Gulf of Mexico, Bihar, India, and Darfur, the hand of human-induced climate change is at 
work. 15 What measure of the work it does, we cannot precisely say. But it is there, now, and as 
the first chapter of this thesis explains, it will probably get worse. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “9.1. Can Individual Extreme Events Be Explained by Greenhouse 
Warming?”, Fourth Assessment Report, from the website of the IPCC, http://ipcc-
wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_Print_Ch09.pdf, p. 696. 
11 Peter Webster et al., “Frequency, Duration, and Intensity of Tropical Cyclonic Storms in a Warming 
Environment,” presented January 31, 2006 at the American Meteorological Society’s 18th Conference on Climate 
Variability and Change, 86th Annual AMS Meeting, Atlanta, GA, January 28 – February 4, 2006. 
12 Ed Malby et al., “How Will Climate Change Affect India's Monsoon Season?”, Science Daily, March 12, 2007, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2007/03/070308121808.htm.  
13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Executive Summary, Chapter 2 (Africa),” The Regional Impacts of 
Climate Change, 1995, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/007.htm. 
14 The recent on-the-ground effects of this radiative forcing have been apparent enough: eleven of the twelve years 
occurring between 1995 and 2006 ranked among the twelve warmest recorded since detailed measurements began 
being kept in 1850. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” Fourth Assessment 
Report, from the website of the IPCC, 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf, pp. 
2-5. 
15 I support these claims in further detail in Chapter One. 
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B. Thesis overview 
This thesis is about justice between present and future generations in the context of 
climate change. In writing it, I have come to see that, despite temporal divides, climate justice in 
the future and climate justice in the present are not fundamentally different propositions. This 
view of mine rests on two foundations. First, I believe the requirements of justice will change 
fundamentally only when the human species changes fundamentally—an occurrence that, given 
the glacial pace of human evolution thus far, I see no reason to foresee in the coming hundred or 
even thousand years. Second, the climate impacts that compromise the provision of justice in the 
future will be largely similar to those that are compromising it now in places like Louisiana, 
Bihar, and Darfur (although runaway sea level rise and other big, yet-unseen problems may 
indeed occur if the world follows a business-as-usual emissions pathway in the coming 
century16).  
All this is not to say that the requirements of justice are ever simple things to fulfill, or 
that the challenges posed to their fulfillment by the effects of human-induced climate change are 
minor. It is simply to say that intergenerational climate justice is not so different from climate 
justice generally. In this thesis, I attempt to measure overlap between the contents of climate 
justice in the short and long terms. I also seek to establish intergenerational and (by extension17) 
international climate justice as ethically obligatory pursuits, rather than as optional benevolences 
for the virtuous. In structuring the thesis, I have drawn on the work of Edward Page, who urges 
people thinking about foundational theories of justice to address the following three questions: 
1. What is the scope of the theory of justice? 
                                                 
16 See Chapter One, Section B of this thesis. 
17 In Chapter Two, I argue that international justice has “relevance for the comprehensive account of 
intergenerational justice this thesis seeks” in light of Edward Page’s observation that “the most vulnerable of all to 
climate change will be future members of developing countries.” Edward Page, Climate Change, Justice and Future 
Generations, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006, p. 36. 
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2. What is the shape of the theory of justice? 
3. What is the currency of the theory of justice?18 
By scope, Page here means the set of entities a theory of justice identifies as legitimate recipients 
of society’s benefits and burdens—that is, as subjects of justice. The scope of justice gives 
boundaries to a system of justice, providing an inventory of the legitimate subjects of justice 
within the system. By shape, Page means the principles according to which a theory of justice 
distributes benefits and burdens. The principles of utility, sufficiency, equality, and priority are 
foundations for different shapes of justice. These are not to be confused with such economic 
formations as capitalism or communism, which may tend toward but are by no means identical 
with particular shapes of distributive justice. And by currency, Page means the “aspect of well-
being, or unit of benefit or advantage, on which our distributive concern should focus.”19  
 I begin the first chapter of this thesis with a series of observations about the features that 
make climate change unique as a matter of justice—namely the intergenerational asymmetry 
associated with it and all other intergenerational processes; the fact that it entails 
intergenerational harms, not just the intergenerational compromising of benefits; its origins in 
emissions-intensive but often necessary human life functions; and the considerable uncertainty 
surrounding its future impacts. These observations point forward to some of the theoretical 
challenges I resolve in my second and third chapters. In the next sections of the Chapter One, I 
outline the impacts that climate scientists expect to result from various emissions trajectories in 
“near future” (that is, the period between now and 2100) and the “distant future” (the period after 
2100). 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 51. 
19 Ibid., p. 51. 
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In the second chapter of the thesis, I make the case for including both future generations 
and foreign peoples in the scope of climate justice, following the assumption that a truly 
comprehensive conception of intergenerational climate justice must include all members of 
future generations, not just the descendants of a particular people. My arguments center on the 
intergenerational and international justice provisions of John Rawls—respectively, the just 
savings principle and the duty of assistance. In the interest of making the theoretical basis for 
intergenerational and international justice as robust and consistent with the challenges of climate 
change as possible, I suggest a set of modifications to Rawls’s arguments. Specifically, I propose 
stripping the just savings principle of its “adjacency constraint,” which requires parties in the 
original position to give special preference to the interests of their “more immediate 
descendants”20 in crafting intergenerational principles and policies. I then recommend expanding 
Rawls’s duty of assistance to include a “duty of compensation,” under which peoples responsible 
for furthering carbon-intensive practices and institutions might remunerate the victims of these 
activities in proportion to their suffering. I find both proposals to be in keeping with the rational 
interests of the parties in the original position, and thus consistent with the wider moral system I 
outline and endorse in the next section of this introduction.  
The final section of the second chapter is a case study on the scope of intergenerational 
climate justice. Its focus is discounting, the process by which modern-day economists and 
policymakers estimate the present value of future benefits and burdens. In the case study, I 
examine an assortment of moral and practical arguments for and against discounting. I conclude 
that the practice is almost certainly unethical within any moral framework that assigns every 
generation an equal claim to justice, as the scope of justice I advance does. Due to a lack of 
technical information, however, I give no final verdict about the practice of discounting for 
                                                 
20 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 255. 
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future extinction risk,21 which I find logically sound but, depending on the factor of extinction 
risk used, potentially unacceptable for the extent to which the practice itself increases 
background extinction risk. 
 In the thesis’s third chapter, I seek to specify what justice consists of—what its currency 
is—in the context of near- and long-term climate change. I reject a trio of basic currencies—
resources, welfare, and opportunity for welfare—on grounds that they do not properly account 
for the basic ethical features of long-term climate change outlined early in Chapter One. I then 
turn my attention to three more sophisticated currencies of justice: social primary goods (as 
advanced by Rawls), basic capabilities (as advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum), 
and vital interests (as advanced by Brian Barry). All of these currencies possess some desirable 
characteristics with respect to the ethical features that make climate change unique. Ultimately, I 
incorporate each into a wider, hybridized definition of the currency of intergenerational climate 
justice. Within this definition, I recommend Sen and Nussbaum’s currency of basic capabilities 
for situations in which climate justice can only be provided through relatively immediate 
adaptation measures. Additionally, I argue that human capability fulfillment is (or should be seen 
as) the ultimate aim of all efforts to ensure climate justice, including the relatively long-term 
push for climate change mitigation through emissions reduction. But I deny that capabilities are 
the most appropriate currency of climate justice for policymakers to consider as they establish 
long-term, mitigation-focused policies for climate protection. For these efforts, I endorse Barry’s 
currency of vital interests, which is simply a slight, sustainability-focused revision to the 
Rawlsian social primary goods. Vital interests and social primary goods, I argue, specify the raw 
materials of climate justice—things like clean water, basic social institutions, and fundamental 
                                                 
21 Cited by Partha Dasgupta in reference to the work of Nicholas Stern and Menachem Yaari. Partha Dasgupta, 
“Discounting Climate Change,” University of Cambridge Working Papers, April 2007, 
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/dasgupta/pub07/stavins_june07.pdf, p. 15.
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rights, liberties, and opportunities—at a level of generality that is consistent with our merely 
general knowledge of both future climate impacts and future needs and preferences. These “raw 
materials” are the only elements of justice that present generations have the power to protect for 
future generations. Indeed, from its position of temporal remove, it would be logically 
inconceivable for the present generation to attend to every last detail of every last future 
individual’s set of capabilities, given uncertainty about both the future climatic results of present 
actions and the particular preferences and interests that future individuals will possess. 
 A lingering unmanaged flaw of the three sophisticated currencies of justice, I note, is 
their failure to account in satisfying ways for the direct harms associated with long-term climate 
change. To remedy this flaw, I suggest incorporating a per-capita entitlement to the global 
atmospheric commons into Barry’s currency of vital interests. This added vital interest, I argue, 
captures both the interest of safety from preventable natural impacts and the interest of justly 
participating in crucial but climate-affecting activities like fossil fuel-based cooking.  
 The final substantial section of Chapter Three and of this thesis examines Cyclone 
Nargis, a storm that has taken 140,000 Burmese lives amid circumstances of profound 
governmental neglect since striking southeast Asia last May. The section provides a case study 
on the currency of intergenerational climate justice, demonstrating why we must regard such 
things as political rights and functioning public institutions, not just obviously necessary items 
like clean water, as parts of climate justice’s currency. 
 
C. Limitations 
 In this thesis, I explore the scope and currency of intergenerational climate justice in 
depth, thus answering two of the three critical preliminary questions Edward Page encourages 
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justice theorists to consider.22 The question I neglect to address is that of justice’s shape, which 
(once again) concerns the principles according to which a theory of justice distributes benefits 
and burdens among members of a society. I exclude the question of shape from this paper 
partially because of time constraints, and partially because I believe it is of marginal importance 
once one has specified a scope and currency of justice. If a society can provide the currency of 
justice specified by an appropriate theory to all the society members this theory includes within 
its scope, the distributive shape by which it does so should not much matter. One can imagine 
cases in which the shape of justice is morally relevant, of course; the best way to provide certain 
resources to a certain range of societal groups could well be to put a benevolent dictator in 
charge of distributing them. Fortunately, it seem such obviously flawed schemes rule themselves 
in the case of my own theory of intergenerational climate justice, whose currency embraces 
political rights and liberties in addition to resources. Nonetheless, I consider my failure to 
address the shape of intergenerational climate justice in this thesis unfortunate. 
Also unfortunate, in this thesis, is my anthropocentrism. For the sake of analytical 
simplicity, I have not made any serious effort to include non-human subjects within the scope of 
intergenerational climate justice I outline here, even though climate change threatens nature very 
seriously. The principle reason for this omission that the addition of non-human perspectives 
would massively complicate my treatment of the original position, the hypothetical framework I 
borrow (from John Rawls) in evaluating most of this paper’s arguments.23 Rawls makes a 
number of small provisions for non-humans (which he regards collectively as a “problem of 
                                                 
22 Page, op. cit., p. 51.  
23 It seems the original position could admit of non-human perspectives only if we enabled non-humans to negotiate 
the just principles and practices of society together with their human counterparts. The sorts of communication that 
this would require become harder and more comical to imagine as the non-human entities in question become more 
different from human beings. We might expect dolphins in the original position to demand principles of justice that 
ensure the protection of their ocean habitat from climate change, but it would be markedly more difficult to predict 
the requests of viruses and bacteria, which may not even experience things like benefit and disadvantage, and which 
may thus be incapable of preferring certain circumstances to others. 
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extension” for his theory of justice as fairness24) that seem to apply to my own arguments as 
well. Specifically, he points to both the long-standing tendency of humans to use animals and 
nature for their benefit and, less instrumentally but perhaps even more conservatively, to the 
argument that constraints on the use of comprehensive doctrines (like religion) in shaping the 
laws and principles that govern plural democratic societies do not apply to arguments about the 
proper relation between humans, animals, and nature, since this is “not a constitutional essential 
or a basic question of justice” in the way that, say, abortion is.25 As a result, Rawls reasons, 
nothing prevents people in liberal societies from working to incorporate their beliefs about 
animal and natural rights into the laws of their societies. This is by no means a positive 
protection for natural rights; in a way it is actually insulting to discourses about just relations 
between humans and nature, since it categorically regards as being something less than 
“constitutional,” “fundamental,” or “basic.” I acknowledge the insufficiency of these provisions 
for animals and non-human nature. Unfortunately, I lack the time in this particular project to 
develop more adequate provisions of my own. 
The coming section provides a detailed description of the original position, which (as I 
have said) provides a key foundation of my reasoning in this paper. 
 
D. A basic approach: Rawls’s original position 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls lays forth a sweeping approach to justice that seeks 
most fundamentally to ensure the “inviolability,” the undeniable basic rights, of each member of 
a free plural society. Relevant for this thesis is the mechanism Rawls uses to account for his 
arguments, namely the original position. By this mechanism Rawls presents a “conception of 
                                                 
24 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 245. 
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 246. 
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justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the 
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.”26 Mirroring the social contract, the 
original position provides fair, equal bargaining conditions for a hypothetical agreement between 
“free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests” about the “principles which 
are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits” in society.27 
A crucial feature of the original position, and one which renders it necessarily hypothetical, is 
that the “persons” have not yet entered the society whose terms they must agree upon; though 
they know they will inevitably occupy stations in the society, they do not yet know and cannot 
control their spatial or temporal positions, or their natural or inherited socioeconomic 
advantages, or even their “conceptions of the good or… special psychological propensities.”28
The parties’ uncertainty about the conditions of the lives they are to inherit—an 
uncertainty Rawls dubs the “veil of ignorance”—compels them to adopt principles of justice, a 
constitution, and structures of basic governance under which they would be willing to live even if 
they found themselves at the lowest social and material rungs of their society. Through a lengthy 
analysis of the features of contemporary plural societies, Rawls derives two particular “principles 
of justice” to which he believes free, equal, rational persons in the original position would likely 
agree.29 Rawls calls the system of justice established by the conditions of the original position 
and the principles agreed to therein “justice as fairness”—a term he uses frequently to describe 
                                                 
26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 10. 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
28 Ibid., p. 11. 
29 These principles are as follows: 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
See Rawls op. cit., p. 266. 
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the notion that a society’s governing principles are just if they are “agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fair.”30
“No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a 
literal sense,” Rawls writes, since real people are in fact born into particular positions in 
particular societies, which affects their “life prospects” and, consequently, compromises their 
ability to reason fairly and objectively toward the conditions of justice. And yet, 
a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to 
being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would 
assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and 
the obligations they recognize self-imposed.31
 
In the following sections, I derive what I take to be the appropriate scope, currency, and shape of 
intergenerational climate justice from the perspective of the original position. In doing so, I seek 
to imbue my principles of intergenerational climate justice with a sense of contractual reciprocity 
in an effort to demonstrate that real-world adherence to these principles is not merely a 
benevolence, not just a mark of altruism, but a positive duty for anyone who views society as a 
system of fair, mutual cooperation over time.32  
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 11. 
31 Ibid., p. 12. 
32 In Political Liberalism, Rawls defines “reasonableness” as the view that society is a system of fair, mutual long-
term cooperation: “Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social 
cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by 
principles and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular 
situations, provided that others also accept those terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must 
reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them… I refer to 
this [requirement of mutual reasonableness] as the criterion of reciprocity. Thus, political rights and duties are 
moral rights and duties, for they are part of a political conception that is a normative (moral) conception with its 
own intrinsic ideal…” (Italics added for emphasis.) I believe this reciprocal understanding of interactions in society 
is what justice requires of each of us. It is my hope that this thesis will influence those possessing a similar view of 
justice in society to take intergenerational climatic obligations seriously. See John Rawls, 1993, Political 
Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, p. xlii. 
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Chapter One: Climate Change in the Near and Distant Future ____________________________ 
A. Preliminary remarks 
Climate change is an intergenerational process, as the second two sections of this chapter 
demonstrate in detail. It thus possesses at least one morally significant feature, common to all 
such processes: the feature of temporal “asymmetry.”33 Because the future lies down the one-
way temporal stream from the present, it must accept the raw impacts of climate change exactly 
as the present chooses to impose them. The future can have no shaping influence over inherited 
processes that affect it. This is certainly true with the case of climate change, for which “the 
difficult tradeoffs must be threshed out in the [present-day] political forum,” though “most of the 
beneficiaries of [climate-friendly] policies will have no direct voice in the debate.”34
 Climate change also possesses a number of morally significant features that make it 
unique among other intergenerational phenomena. First and foremost, unlike such challenges as 
monetary saving and the preservation of scarce natural resources, which concern the passage of 
benefits between generations, climate change involves also the imposition of harm—although 
these harms do have important implications for the long-term maintenance of beneficial stocks of 
physical resources. (Importantly, harm from climate change is now preventable only to an extent, 
since a certain measure of climate change would be bound to occur even if everyone in the world 
stopped emitting greenhouse gases today.35) Second, climate change is a byproduct of present-
day activities that are in many cases necessary for the survival of contemporary people (though it 
                                                 
33Rasmus Karlsson, “Reducing Asymmetries in Intergenerational Justice: Descent from Modernity or Space 
Industrialization?” Organization and Environment, 19, 2006, p. 233. 
34 Raymond Pierrehumbert, “Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion,” Chicago Journal of International 
Law, 6:2, 2006, pp. 249-250. 
35 As I note later in this chapter, half of the global average surface temperature change slated to occur between now 
and approximately 2040 is “locked in” by greenhouse gases already emitted. Gerald Meehl and Thomas Stocker, 
“Chapter 10 - Global Climate Projections,” Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, from the website of 
IPCC Working Group I, 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf, p. 762. 
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is certainly possible to distinguish between the “subsistence emissions” of the poor and the 
“luxury emissions” of wealthy jet-setters.36) Third, the coming impacts of climate change are by 
no means certain, given the presence of what Stephen Schneider and Janica Lane call 
“uncertainty explosions,” through which relatively small uncertainties about future emissions 
trajectories combine with additional uncertainties about climatic responses to these trajectories 
and about the regional distribution of impacts arising from these responses to form large 
measures of uncertainty that make the impacts of our present-day greenhouse gas emissions 
dangerous but hard to predict with specificity.  
    FIGURE 1. Uncertainty explosion37
 
These features of climate change combine to form an intergenerational phenomenon that 
future peoples are almost certain to find harmful, but which is, unlike theft, murder, and other 
traditional intragenerational harms, compounded incrementally by everyone now alive, 
                                                 
36 Henry Shue discusses this distinction between kinds of emissions, as well as climate change’s character as a 
source of intergenerational harm, in his writings on climate change and environmental philosophy. Henry Shue, 
“Climate,” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, ed. Dale Jamieson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, pp. 
449-459. 
37 Taken from Stephen Schneider and Janica Lane, “Dangers and Thresholds in Climate Change and the 
Implications for Justice,” in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, eds. W. Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, 
Saleemul Huq, and M.J. Mace, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p. 32.  
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associated with perfectly justifiable functions of life, and only partially preventable through 
mitigation (therefore requiring also remediation through adaptation). 
 
B. The near future: climate change through 2100 
In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published its Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4), a summary of the most recent findings on climate change from 2,500 of the 
world’s leading climate experts. In its third section, the report examines likely near- and long-
term climate impacts in two broad groups of emissions scenarios—group A, in which status quo 
levels of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions remain the norm, and group B, in 
which current energy consumption and emissions decline and efforts to improve environmental 
sustainability and social equity gain momentum. None of the scenarios include climate policy 
provisions beyond those already in place (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol), and none have been assigned 
probability figures. Table 1 and Figure 2 provide greenhouse gas emissions estimates, 
temperature change estimates, and sea level rise estimates through 2100 for the A and B groups; 
the following paragraphs describe the characteristics of these groups’ sub-scenarios (A1FI, A1B, 







TABLE 1. Projected global average surface warming and sea level rise for SRES scenarios38
 
The A1 family of sub-scenarios models a world marked by “very rapid economic growth, 
low population growth, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies,” 
along with “convergence among [nations’ economic and trade policies and per capita income 
levels], capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions.”39 This family contains 
three sub-scenarios—A1FI (fossil intensive), A1T (high technology), and A1B (balanced), with 
A1FI generating the most emissions and A1T generating the least.40
 
 
                                                 
38 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” Fourth Assessment Report, from the 
website of the IPCC, 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_topic3.pdf, p. 7. 
39 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “SRES Scenario Taxonomy,” Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios, from the website of the IPCC, 2000, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/091.htm#4.2.1. 
40 Stephen Schneider and Janica Lane, “Dangers and Thresholds in Climate Change and the Implications for 
Justice,” in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, eds. W. Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, Saleemul Huq, and M.J. 





FIGURE 2. Projected GHG emissions through 2100 for SRES scenarios41
 
 The world of the A2 scenario is “very heterogeneous” in its cultural practices, fertility 
patterns, and approaches to economic development. Population growth is rapid in A2, while 
economic growth and technological change are “more fragmented and slower than in other story 
lines.”42  
 The B1 scenario shares with the A1 family a low average population growth rate. Unlike 
the A1 scenarios, however, the B1 scenario is the site of “rapid changes in economic structures 
toward a service and information economy… reductions in material intensity, and the 
introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies.” B1 provides an equitable “alternative 
                                                 
41Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” Fourth Assessment Report, from the 
website of the IPCC, 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_topic3.pdf, p. 7. 
42 IPCC, “SRES Scenario Taxonomy.” 
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vision” of social and technological change, and offers the lowest energy consumption and 
emissions figures of the all the SRES scenarios.43
 Like B1, the B2 scenario emphasizes environmental sustainability and social equity. 
Population growth and economic development are moderate in the B2 scenario, but 
technological change is slower and more geographically fragmented than in A1 or B1. Local and 
regional initiatives, not international agreements, are the primary drivers of improvements in 
sustainability and equity.44
 Given the measure of randomness responsible for climatic phenomena and the many 
uncertainties that bedevil global circulation models (GCMs) and climate impact assessments—a 
combination referred to as the “uncertainty explosion” by Schneider and Lane45—we cannot 
meaningfully link physical climate impacts of specific magnitudes with particular emissions 
scenarios. Even if we could, the labeling of certain magnitudes of climate change as 
“dangerous,” and the implicit labeling of lesser magnitudes as “safe,” would remain a subjective 
and inherently political process resting on individual tolerances for risk.46 But for those who will 
be born in this century, the scenario after which we humans model our emissions trajectories 
matters a good deal. Although our species’s greenhouse gas emissions will continue to drive a 
measure of global warming through the year 2100 no matter what emissions pathways we 
implement, the magnitude of our emissions shares a direct relationship with the magnitude of the 
warming (see Table 1)—and thus the magnitude of the impacts—that we will likely observe. 
This is particularly true of estimates about the warming that will occur more than twenty years 
from now. Though half of the global average surface temperature change slated to occur between 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Schneider and Lane, op. cit., p. 32. 
46 Ibid., p. 33. 
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now and approximately 2040 is “locked in” by already-emitted greenhouse gases that will 
remain in the atmosphere for some years,  
by mid-century, the choice of scenarios becomes more important for the magnitude of warming, with a 
range of 0.46ºC, and with about one-third of that warming due to climate change that is already committed 
to. But by the late [21st] century, there are clear consequences for which scenario is followed, with a range 
of 1.3°C in these results, with as little as 18% of that warming coming from climate change that is already 
committed to.47
 
Table 2 provides an index of some of the potential climate change impacts projected for the mid- 
to late-21st century. It is once again impossible to link impacts of specific magnitudes with 
particular emissions scenarios, but we can assume that greenhouse gas-intensive scenarios like 
A1FI will generally increase the magnitude of predicted climate impacts more than low-
emissions scenarios like B1 will. 
 The direct relationship between the greenhouse-gas intensity of our emissions trajectories 
and the magnitude of the impacts that will befall the world in the 21st century is a good reason to 
choose less emissions-intensive trajectories, particularly if we wish to avoid saddling those born 
later in the century with burdens they did not create. But there are at least two other reasons for 
avoiding emissions-intensive trajectories. First, these trajectories increase the risk of abrupt and 
irreversible climate changes and “climate surprises.” Second, emissions-intensive trajectories 
chosen now will constrain the ability of policymakers and environmental regulators working in 









                                                 
47 Meehl and Stocker, op. cit., p. 762. 
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TABLE 2. Potential climate impacts in the mid- to late-21st century48
 
                                                 
48 In IPCC terminology, “virtually certain” means “having > 99% probability of occurrence”; “very likely,” > 90% 
probability; “likely,” > 66% probability; “about as likely as not,” 33%-66% probability; “unlikely,” < 33% 
probability; “very unlikely,” < 10% probability; and “exceptionally unlikely,” < 1% probability. IPCC, “Summary 
for Policy Makers,” p. 12. 
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The best-documented example of the sort of abrupt, “surprising” climate impacts I have 
just referenced involves possible changes to the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation 
(MOC), also known as the thermohaline circulation (from the Greek roots thermo-, for “heat,” 
and –haline, for “sea” or “salt”) or the Great Conveyor.49 Crucial to the MOC-induced 
circulation of the world’s oceans are depth-based variations in seawater’s density, which varies 
with temperature and salinity. Because it involves the transfer of vast amounts of heat among the 
oceans, this pattern of global seawater circulation is an important regulator of climate in many of 
the world’s inhabited places, notably Western Europe. By increasing both precipitation and the 
rate at which freshwater from the Greenland ice sheet enters the North Atlantic, global warming 
could reduce the salinity and associated density of seawater enough to weaken or interrupt the 
MOC, possibly leading to abrupt climatic changes in certain geographies. Such a weakening 
appears to be the cause of a rapid North Atlantic cooling event that occurred 8,200 years ago, 
during which average temperatures in the region fell by 2-3°C (3.5-5.5°F) over a matter of 
decades.50 Although virtually all GCMs indicate that a complete shutdown of the MOC would 
require “many decades to more than a century” of rapid warming, the processes that would be 
required for such a shutdown remain very poorly understood.51 Given this limited understanding, 
precaution urges us to avoid excessive greenhouse gas emissions: a shutdown of the MOC 
occurring over even a century could alter the geography of agricultural production faster than 
humans could respond, leading to catastrophic levels of scarcity. 
Changes to the MOC constitute one of many potential scenarios for abrupt climate 
change. Of equal concern for those living at the end of the 21st century is the prodigious 
                                                 
49 Meehl and Stocker, op. cit., p. 775. 
50Allegra LeGrande and Gavin Schmidt, “Modeling an Abrupt Climate Change,” from the website of the NASA 
Goddard Institute for Space Sciences, 2006, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/legrande_01/. 
51 Meehl and Stocker, op. cit., p. 775. 
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influence current emissions trajectories will have on climate change mitigation efforts later on. 
The sources of this influence are twofold.  
First, natural climate feedback effects—“changes in the planetary energy balance induced 
by climate change that can magnify or diminish climate response,” in the words of Hansen52— 
are likely to amplify human contributions to climate change. Because some feedbacks will only 
manifest themselves beyond certain thresholds of human-induced warming, greenhouse gas-
intensive emissions trajectories entail a kind of double imposition on future atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations. First, by emitting large quantities of greenhouse gases now, and 
thereby driving relatively large measures of global warming, we may unlock large stores of 
methane previously frozen in the Arctic permafrost53 or (through our unwitting tinkering with 
the oceans’ thermal mixing) churn deep-ocean carbon upward into the atmosphere,54 thus 
consigning ourselves and those living later in the century to measures of warming that would not 
have occurred if not for our large initial emissions.55  
Second, CO2, methane, and the many other known greenhouse gases possess a range of 
atmospheric lifetimes, which means that some of the gases we release into the atmosphere now 
will continue to warm the planet for decades, centuries, or millennia to come. In the next section, 
we explore these and other temporally distant climate impacts. 
                                                 
52 James Hansen, “Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb,” Scientific American, 290:3, 2004, pp. 68-77. 
53 Katey Walter, Laurence Smith, and F. Stuart Chapin III, “Methane Bubbling From Northern Lakes: Present and 
Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 365, 2007, 
p. 1657. 
54 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” p. 13. 
55 Permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere contains an estimated 950 billion tons of CO2 equivalents (much of it in 
the form of methane)—enough to double current atmospheric CO2 concentrations, if released at once (Walter et al. 
2007, p. 1666). Further, after being “unlocked” by permafrost thawing associated with global warming, many 
Northern greenhouse gas pockets release their through ebullition, in which gases bubble upward through ice or soil. 
These subterranean pockets may take 500-1,000 years to release all of their stored greenhouse gases (Walter et al. 
2007, p. 1669). If we wish to avoid unleashing potentially massive natural stores of greenhouse gases on peoples of 
the distant future, we should avoid crossing the warming thresholds that “unlock” such feedback effects, whatever 
these thresholds may be. This seems to imply selecting the least emissions-intensive development trajectories 
available to us. 
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C. The distant future: climate change beyond 2100 
 The atmospheric lifetime of carbon dioxide—that is, the amount of time it takes the 
average CO2 molecule to leave the atmosphere after entering it—is often mistakenly quoted at 
about 100 years. This estimate is the result of a “fallacious and largely meaningless method of 
aggregating the many physical processes that operate on widely differing time scales into a 
single number.”56 Though a small portion of the CO2 emitted today will settle quickly into the 
ocean, about one quarter will remain in the atmosphere 500 years later, and seven percent will 
linger on for hundreds of thousands of years.57 Given these lifetimes, it goes nearly without 
saying that the rate of CO2 emissions “greatly exceeds” the rate of CO2 removal, resulting in an 
atmospheric accumulation of CO2 that extends over staggering temporal scales.58  Other 
greenhouse gases, like CFC-11, leave the atmosphere through one or a few removal processes, 
and thus possess singular atmospheric lifetimes.59 Table 3 provides atmospheric lifetimes for 
CFC-11, CO2, and four other greenhouse gases. HFC-23 and CF4, it is worth noting, possess 
singular atmospheric lifetimes of 260 years and more than 50,000 years, respectively. 
Considered with the roughly seven percent of CO2, molecules that remain in the atmosphere for 
hundreds of thousands of years, these gases provide a sense of the vast temporal reach of our 
present-day activities. 
 
                                                 
56 Pierrehumbert, op. cit., p. 577. 
57 Ibid., p. 577. 
58 Meehl and Stocker, op. cit., p. 825. 
59 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Topic 3 – Climate Change and its Impacts in the Near and Long 




TABLE 3. Six greenhouse gases and their atmospheric lifetimes60
  
 What impacts do our emissions portend for distant future generations? Scientific 
understanding of climate impacts grows hazier as time scales grow longer. All the same, the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report offers two broad but salient observations about long-term 
climate impacts. First, even if we stabilize our emissions at a relatively low constant (i.e. non-
increasing) levels by 2100, global average temperature increases will continue for at least a 
millennium, and sea level rise will continue for the next few centuries. Global average 
temperature increases, which would reach about 0.5°C within a few centuries under a stabilized 
emissions scenario, will continue because of the long atmospheric lifetime of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases; sea level rise, which would reach 0.3-0.8 meters within a few centuries under 
such a scenario, will continue because of the large time scales associated with the full thermal 
expansion of seawater.61 Second, if global average surface temperatures increase by 1.9-4.6°C or 
                                                 
60 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Technical Summary,” Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, 
from the website of IPCC Working Group I, 2001, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/016.htm. 
61 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007b, “Topic 3 – Climate Change and its Impacts in the Near and 
Long Term Under Different Scenarios,” Fourth Assessment Report, from the website of the IPCC, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_topic3.pdf. 
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more beyond pre-industrial baselines (an eminently possible outcome for this century) and 
remain at these elevated levels for a few millennia, the Greenland ice sheet will probably 
disappear completely, resulting in a very gradual sea level rise of about 7 meters.62  
 If 21st-century emissions trajectories take us beyond the aforementioned temperature 
increase ranges—which emissions scenarios A1FI, A1B, and A2 are all likely to do (see Table 
1)—long-term ice melting and associated sea level rise will presumably be even more severe 




















Chapter Two: The Scope of Intergenerational Climate Justice____________________________ 
A. Preliminary remarks 
Intergenerational relations has been the subject of considerable recent scholarship, as worries 
about nuclear waste generation and other long-term, industrial-scale environmental problems 
have come to the fore.63 By no means do these concerns predate ethical interest in justice 
between generations, however; John Rawls gives an especially thorough account of  
intergenerational justice in his Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993), despite 
making little mention of environmental concerns in either work. 
Rawls’s interpretation of the scope of justice—that is, the subjects his theory regards as 
legitimate recipients of a society’s benefits and burdens—differs somewhat between A Theory of 
Justice and his later works, most notably Political Liberalism, which provides a framework for 
the application of the principles of justice in contemporary democratic societies, and The Law of 
Peoples, which concerns Rawls’s theory of just relations between peoples.64 In each text Rawls 
uses the premises of justice as fairness to argue for a more or less universal account of human 
justice, which regards people of all spatial and temporal positions as the just theoretical 
beneficiaries of rights and “social primary goods.” Before assessing Rawls’s treatment of these 
“goods” as the currency of justice, I turn to a discussion of the intergenerational justice 
provisions Rawls outlines in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism—which hinge not on 
his two principles of justice but on a distributive mechanism he calls the “just savings 
principle”—and, secondly, the international justice provisions Rawls outlines in The Law of 
                                                 
63 See, for example, Clark Wolf, “Intergenerational Justice,” in A Companion to Applied Ethics, eds. R.G. Frey and 
Christopher Wellman, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 279-294. 
64 The Law of Peoples has often been described as a treatise on “international relations.” Though the work does 
indeed reflect on global justice and the interactions between societies, it does so in considerable abstraction from the 
contemporary world order, taking “peoples” rather than “states” as the relevant units of governance. It therefore 
seems appropriate to call The Law of Peoples something other than an “international relations” text, given the 
considerable disconnect between the theory it details and the world of states in which we live. See John Rawls, The 
Law of Peoples, 1999, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
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People, which consist in the “second original position” and international “duty of assistance” he 
describes therein. Why this consideration of Rawlsian international justice? As Page notes, “the 
most vulnerable of all to climate change will be future members of developing countries;”65 it 
follows that Rawls’s international justice provisions, as I interpret them for the case of climate 
change, have relevance for the comprehensive account of intergenerational justice this thesis 
seeks. Unlike his most recently updated intergenerational justice provisions, however, the 
international justice provisions of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples possess significant flaws, as I 
discuss in the section after next. 
 
B. Intergenerational justice and the just savings principle66 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls observes that “there are no [moral] grounds for discounting 
future well-being on the basis of pure time preference” (p. 253); this provides the initial impetus 
for his consideration of justice between generations. For all its usefulness in the establishment of 
just reciprocity between contemporary members of the same society, Rawls finds that the veil of 
ignorance fails to secure justice between generations because, given the “present time of entry 
interpretation”67 that unites the parties as members of the same generation, the parties can “favor 
their generation by refusing to make any sacrifices at all for their successors” (p. 121). Rawls 
attempts to remedy the situation by tacking two constraints to the veil of ignorance. The first—
what I call the adjacency constraint—assumes that the parties in the original position have 
families and requires that they “care at least about their more immediate [or temporally adjacent] 
                                                 
65 Page, op. cit., p. 36.  
66 In this section, parenthetical page citations refer to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971. 
67 In justifying his “present time of entry interpretation,” Rawls remarks that the original position “is not a gathering 
of all actual or possible persons. If we conceived of the original position in [this way], the conception would cease to 
be a natural guide to intuition and would lack a clear sense.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 120. 
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descendants,” while the second—what I call the universality constraint—requires the parties to 
adopt only those principles that they “wish all earlier generations to have followed” (p. 255). 
Together with the veil of ignorance, these constraints constitute the “just savings principle,” 
which for Rawls is simply an “understanding between generations to carry their fair share of the 
burden of realizing and preserving a just society” (p. 257). Rawls contextualizes the just savings 
principle within the principles of justice by asserting that just savings are to “constrain the 
application of the difference principle” (p. 258), or second principle of justice,68 which might in 
the absence of such a constraint require the maximization of the prospects of the least 
advantaged within a present generation to the detriment of the least advantaged across 
subsequent generations. 
Rawls’s adjacency and universality constraints prove incompatible with one another in 
view of the uneven temporal distribution of benefits and burdens that afflict the contemporary 
world. Nitrogenous fertilizers provide one example.69 Since the Green Revolution, these 
fertilizers have played a critical role in increasing and sustaining crop yields around the world, 
contributing importantly to the ongoing global struggle against hunger.70 Hunger threatens 
temporally adjacent generations by threatening the lives of poor people—child bearers and 
potential child bearers—who are living now. Insofar as nitrogenous fertilizers alleviate the threat 
of hunger to adjacent generations, they may be called consistent with the adjacency constraint to 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance. 
                                                 
68 Rawls’s second principle of justice, which he and others also call the “Difference Principle,” reads: 
“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(c) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(d) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” 
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 266. 
69 This example is undoubtedly a simplification of the challenges of modern agriculture, but it serves to illustrate 
how very conceivable the conflict between Rawls’s adjacency and universality constraints is. 
70 Balu Bumb and Carlos Baanante, “Policies to Promote Environmentally Sustainable Fertilizer Use and Supply to 
2020,” from the website of 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment, October 1996, 
http://www.ifpri.org/2020/BRIEFS/NUMBER40.HTM. 
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Unfortunately, the production of nitrogenous fertilizer requires substantial inputs of 
energy, and its application on farms has been demonstrated to increase nitrous oxide (N2O) 
emissions from soil significantly.71 N2O, a potent greenhouse gas that is the world’s third largest 
contributor to the greenhouse effect after CO2 and methane,72 possesses an atmospheric lifetime 
of 114 years.73 Thus, nitrogenous fertilizer use may be said to threaten temporally distant 
generations, since it results in additions to the greenhouse effect that will continue to manifest 
themselves 114 years into the future—in apparent violation of the universality constraint to 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance. Since neither the adjacency constraint nor the universality constraint 
has primacy over the other, we are faced with an irresolvable conflict. For the matter of 
nitrogenous fertilizer use, Rawls’s just savings principle seems to be unworkable. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls recognizes this difficulty with the just savings principle 
outlined in A Theory of Justice.74 As a remedy, he strips the principle of its adjacency constraint, 
emphasizing again the large set of conceivable generations his universality constraint protects 
through the features inherent in its structure: 
…the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all 
generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to follow (and later generations to 
follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in time.75  
 
Rawls notes that this revision to the just savings principal removes the need for an adjacency 
constraint: the purpose of this initial requirement, under which it is assumed that parties in the 
original position “care for their [immediate] descendants,” is to dissuade these parties (who are 
                                                 
71 Bumb and Baanante, op. cit. 
72 Energy Research Center of the Netherlands staff, “N2O abatement in the chemical industry,” from the website of 
the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands, 2008, http://www.ecn.nl/en/h2sf/products-services/catalytic-
emission-reduction/n2o/. 
73 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Technical Summary,” Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, 
from the website of IPCC Working Group I, 2001, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/016.htm. 
74 Rawls notes in Political Liberalism that the “account in Theory, §44 (‘Justice between Generations’) is defective.” 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 20. 
75 Ibid., p. 274. (Italics added for emphasis.) 
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bound together in the same uncertain generation by Rawls’s “present time of entry” 
interpretation) from “refusing to make any savings at all” for future generations.76 Political 
Liberalism specifies that the parties are to select a just savings principle “subject to the… 
condition that they must want all previous generations to have followed it.” 77
 Stripped of the adjacency constraint, the just savings principle seems to provide a clear 
solution to the problem of nitrogenous fertilizer use: if the fertilizer’s intergenerational effects 
are so bad that a person in the original position would prefer for all previous generations to have 
abstained from its use, then the fertilizer should not be used; more intergenerationally benign 
solutions to problems of hunger should be found. Indeed, such solutions—which include more 
energy efficient fertilizer production78 and no-till farming techniques that reduce the amount of 
N2O fertilized soil emits79—are already being implemented in practice, suggesting that (for this 
example at least) the mandates of the newly stripped just savings principle are reasonable 
enough.  
 More generally, Rawls’s new approach succeeds in mirroring the universal logic of 
Rawls’s original position, insofar as it removes the requirement that people care for their most 
immediate descendants. This former requirement was considerably less consistent with the 
notion of “mutual disinterest” between generations than is Rawls’s newer approach, which 
encourages the selection of a just savings principle not on the basis of family ties—ties peoples 
in a plural society like the one for which Rawls writes may or may not possess—but on the basis 
of contractual self-interest.  
 
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 274. 
77 Ibid., p. 274. 
78 Bumb and Baanante, op. cit. 
79 Carl Bernacchi, Steven Hollinger, and Tilden Meyers, “The conversion of the corn/soybean ecosystem to no-till 
agriculture may result in a carbon sink,” Global Change Biology, 12:8, 2006, pp. 1585-1586. 
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C. International justice and the duty of assistance 
1. Problems of representation in the second original position 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls extends the logic of his original position—which he 
designs in A Theory of Justice to serve only the potential members of particular liberal societies 
at particular shared points in time—to the international “Society of Peoples.”80 He accomplishes 
this through the application of a second hypothetical original position that serves to “extend a 
liberal conception to the Law of Peoples.”81 The conditions for justice as fairness in this original 
position are much the same as those in the first: here as before, the parties are “situated 
symmetrically… modeled as rational… and subject to a veil of ignorance.”82 Controversially, 
Rawls interprets the appropriate parties in the second original position to be liberal peoples, 
headed by “rational representatives,” rather than individual persons. Rawls’s reasons for 
interpreting the parties as such are unclear; as Gary Chartier notes,83 Rawls promises in his 
introduction to The Law of Peoples to describe the qualities that give peoples and not persons the 
“status of the (moral) actors,” but fails do so in any satisfying way later in the work.84  
What is problematic about Rawls’s interpretation of the parties to the second original 
position as peoples, rather than persons? As Chartier points out,85 Rawls conceives of this 
original position as containing both liberal democratic peoples and “decent hierarchical 
societies”—societies that may not regard all the people they contain as “free and equal citizens, 
nor as separate individuals deserving representation,” but which at the very least possess 
“consultation hierarchies” into which unrepresented groups can channel their requests and 
                                                 
80 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 3. 
81 Ibid., p. 3. 
82 Ibid., p. 32. 
83 Gary Chartier, “Peoples or Persons? Revising Rawls on Global Justice,” Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, 27:1, 2004, p. 1. 
84 Ibid., p. 5. 
85 Ibid., p. 5. 
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complaints.86 Because Rawls believes interventions in the internal affairs of decent hierarchical 
peoples by liberal democratic peoples unacceptably violate the autonomy of these hierarchical 
peoples, Chartier expresses the legitimate concern that Rawls’s conception of the parties as 
peoples may leave certain citizens both unrepresented in their home societies and unprotected by 
a higher international body or set of principles, with troubling implications for the protection of 
human rights. 
Rawls’s peoples-based approach to constituting the second original position is 
problematic also from the perspective of intergenerational climate change. It is increasingly well-
recognized in the field of international environmental development that any just international 
climate policy response, whether the Kyoto Protocol or something else, must supplement its 
efforts at climate change mitigation with comparable provisions for climate adaptation. An 
international system devised by the representatives of existing peoples in the second original 
position cannot be guaranteed to create representation-based channels for communicating the 
particular adaptation needs of individual groups of persons in hierarchical societies—particularly 
marginal minority groups in the societies, which are often the first to suffer from the sorts of 
environmental problems and resource shortages we expect from climate change—to national-
level agencies charged with distributing the means of adaptation.87 This shortcoming, it seems, 
would render international systems generated under the Rawlsian second original position 
considerably less responsive to the climate adaptation needs of people now and in the future than 
a system devised via a cosmopolitan, or person-based, second original position.  
Chartier correctly asserts that a person-based second original position is compatible with 
Rawls’s wider account of justice between peoples, given in particular Rawls’s emphasis in A 
                                                 
86 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 72. 
87 This suggestion appears to be tragically borne out by my case study, in Chapter Three, on the Burmese military 
junta’s failure to help its citizens respond to Cyclone Nargis. 
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Theory of Justice on justice for and between individual persons.”88 Consequently, I endorse for 
my own model of intergenerational climate justice a cosmopolitan second original position 
approach for devising principles of international justice, which, as Page and others rightly argue, 
is inextricable from the broader challenge of justice between generations.89
 
2. Problems with the duty of assistance90
As I note in my upcoming discussion of the currency of intergenerational climate justice, 
climate change implies an increase in the incidence of natural disasters both short (like 
hurricanes) and protracted (like sea level rise). In The Law of Peoples, Rawls observes that well-
ordered peoples owe a “duty of assistance” to societies burdened by such unfavorable conditions 
(p. 106). He regards this duty as parallel to the just savings principle outlined in A Theory of 
Justice, since “in each instance, the aim is to realize and preserve just (or decent) institutions” (p. 
107). For Rawls, this duty does not entail unbounded giving to disadvantaged people. Rather, it 
takes as its target and “cutoff point” the raising of the world’s poor into positions of free 
citizenship within either reasonably liberal societies or decent hierarchical societies (p. 119). In 
this section, I examine the implications of Rawls’s cutoff point for present-day global justice in 
the context of climate change. Though I ultimately embrace Rawls’s assertion that the difference 
principle should not apply between peoples in the global sphere, I argue for extending the duty of 
assistance’s cutoff point to require that wealthy well-ordered societies mitigate the burdens their 
practices impose on the world by either refraining entirely from harmful institutional practices 
                                                 
88 Chartier op. cit., p. 15. 
89 Page op. cit., p. 36. 
90 In this section and two sections following it, parenthetical page citations refer to Rawls’s The Law of Peoples, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
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(such as carbon-intensive production processes) or, barring this, by financially compensating 
other societies in proportion to the damages imposed on them. 
 
3. Limits to the duty of assistance and their implications in the context of climate change 
 Rawls illustrates the need for limits on well-ordered societies’ obligations to burdened 
societies by means of two hypothetical scenarios (pp. 117-118). In the first scenario, two “liberal 
decent societies” begin with equal resources and population sizes, but quickly lose parity after 
the first society industrializes and increases its rate of savings, leaving the “more pastoral and 
leisurely” second society behind (p. 117). The second scenario is similar, except that now the 
disparity arises after the first society willfully reduces its population growth rate by stressing the 
“elements of equal justice for women” (p. 117), thus increasing its rate of savings relative to the 
second society, which despite possessing similar elements of gender equality fails to reduce its 
population growth, owing to its “prevailing religious and social values” (p. 118). In both 
scenarios, Rawls finds it unreasonable to require (as Thomas Pogge’s global egalitarian 
principle91 does) that the wealthier first society tax itself to assist its less disciplined counterpart, 
since “both societies are liberal or decent, and their peoples free and… able to make their own 
decisions” (p. 118).  
Rawls rests his principal contention about the duty of assistance—that this duty ends 
once the assisted society has developed a working liberal or decent government—on the 
supposition that such governments give people “sufficient all-purpose means to make intelligent 
and effective use of their freedoms and to lead reasonable and worthwhile lives” (p. 114). 
Climate change challenges this supposition, since it threatens to dramatically disrupt and in some 
cases end the lives of people around the world without regard for the social and political 
                                                 
91 Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23:3, 1994, pp. 195-224. 
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“ordering” of the societies in which they live. The “cutoff point” Rawls places on his duty of 
assistance suggests that, in their efforts to help poor societies prepare themselves for climate 
change’s effects, wealthy well-ordered societies should provide aid only until the recipients of 
this aid become liberal or decent. Climate change does not cease to threaten societies once they 
reach these points, of course, nor does the development of liberal or decent government confer 
on poor peoples the resources many of them need to adapt to climate change’s effects. 
Importantly, these well-ordered poor peoples (like poor peoples in general) tend to bear very 
little responsibility for climate change, relative to wealthier nations like the United States. 
Bangladesh provides an illustrative example.  
A parliamentary democracy with a functioning constitution, a widely shared language 
(Bangla, spoken by 98 percent of the population) and religion (Islam, followed by 83 percent of 
the population), and a 17-year track record of free, fair democratic elections,92 Bangladesh 
appears to fit Rawls’s definition of a liberal people.93 Despite all this, Bangladesh remains 
extremely poor and, given its low-lying coastal geography and extensive human reliance on rice 
grown in the floodplains of the Brahmaputra and Ganges Rivers,94 exceptionally vulnerable to 
climate change-induced sea level rise.95 The costs of Bangladesh’s adaptation to climate 
change—though difficult to estimate—will include the costs of developing coastal zone 
management systems and relocating people whose homes are inundated. These expenses are 
                                                 
92 Central Intelligence Agency, “Bangladesh,” The World Factbook, from the website of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html. 
93 For Rawls, liberal peoples are those that have “three basic features: a reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united by… ‘common sympathies;’ and finally, a moral 
nature. The first is institutional, the second is cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a political (moral) 
conception of right and justice” (pp. 23-24). 
94 Central Intelligence Agency op. cit. 
95 A 1.5 meter sea level rise would inundate 16 percent of Bangladesh’s total land area, displacing or killing as many 
as 25 million of its people. Bruce Douglas, Sea Level Rise: History and Consequences, San Diego: Academic Press, 
2001, p.  200. See also Anwar Ali, “Vulnerability of Bangladesh to Climate Change and Sea Level Rise Through 
Tropical Cyclones and Storm Surges,” Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, 92:1-2, 1996, pp. 171-179.  
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likely to be prohibitive. The cruel irony in all this, of course, is that Bangladesh contributes 
negligibly to the problem of climate change, having been the source of a little more than 0.1 
percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions in 2004—about 1/160th the contribution of the 
United States, which was the source of 22 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions that 
year.96
The cutoff point Rawls assigns to the duty of assistance suggests that Bangladesh should 
receive no assistance from wealthier peoples, since it is itself well-ordered. Given Bangladesh’s 
poverty, vulnerability, and utter lack of culpability for the primary problem that now threatens it, 
this suggestion seems to violate basic notions of fairness, as specified by the logic of the original 
position. Climate change is a byproduct of the world’s industrial economy, an institution that 
benefits from and is sustained primarily by the world’s wealthiest societies. As Pogge notes,97 
those that benefit from and sustain such institutions share responsibility for their effects. In light 
of this, it seems obvious that the wealthy must give considerably more to the climate mitigation 
and adaptation efforts than the duty of assistance’s cutoff point now requires. In the next section, 
I develop a more appropriate boundary for the duty of assistance. 
 
4. A solution: the duty of compensation 
If the cutoff point Rawls provides for his duty of assistance is not sufficient to ensure 
global justice in the context of climate change, what is? Extending Rawls’s difference principle 
to the Society of Peoples would require the arrangement of social and economic inequalities such 
                                                 
96 United Nations Statistics Division, “Carbon dioxide emissions in metric tons per capita,” Millennium 
Development Goals Indicators, website of the United Nations, 2007,  
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=751&crid=. 
97 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2002, p. 112. 
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that these inequalities would afford “the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”98 As Rawls 
notes, this arrangement would likely entail a massive redistribution of wealth from the rich to the 
global poor, until the only remaining inequalities would be those possessing some net utility for 
the global poor. Such an undertaking would presumably provide developing countries with the 
resources and institutions necessary to mount appropriate adaptive responses to climate change’s 
impacts, and would furthermore compel wealthy societies to dramatically reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, in light of the poor’s expropriation of the resources these rich 
societies had once relied on for their energy- and carbon-intensive lifestyles. These emissions-
reducing redistributions would alleviate inequality, in keeping with the difference principle, by 
limiting the profits of the wealthy and the magnitude of climate change’s impacts for the worst 
off while improving both the immediate economic prospects and the long-term adaptive capacity 
of these worst off. In these ways the application of the difference principle to the world order 
would indeed result in strides toward a just climate future. 
As mentioned previously, however, the expenditures of money and effort required for a 
global application of the difference principle would likely be prohibitively large, since nothing 
short of total wealth redistribution would fulfill this principle. Furthermore, such a total 
redistribution could well be unjust. As Rawls notes in the two hypothetical scenarios (p. 117-
118) discussed previously, differing conceptions of the good sometimes lead free liberal societies 
to different levels of saving and industriousness, which can in turn give way to disparities in 
wealth. Though inequalities that entail inadequacies of food, education, and other basic human 
provisions should be eliminated regardless of their origin,99 it is unfair to regard all differences 
                                                 
98 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 266. 
99 The human rights to basic physical necessities (including food) and to education are outlined in Articles 25 and 26 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,” website of the United Nations, 1998, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
 40
in the relative advantages enjoyed by societies as assistance obligations for the wealthiest 
societies, so long as these differences do not hinder the aforementioned fulfillment of basic 
human needs. Significantly, total redistribution as part of an international application of the 
difference principle would also eliminate nations’ incentives to save by subjecting their gains 
from saving to seizure under conditions of even marginal inequality. 
The inequalities of greatest concern seem in any case to be those that arise systematically 
and pervasively from global institutions, not those that arise from differences in saving.100 
Justice requires that peoples take steps toward phasing out their interactions with (and 
subsequent support of) harmful institutions like carbon-intensive industries or that they 
compensate the victims of those institutions in which they cannot avoid participating. We need 
not stray from Rawls’s cutoff point for the duty of general assistance; we can argue that 
assistance conducted for the specific purpose of compensation has no cutoff point, extending 
instead to all the peoples that need it, ideally (for the sake of efficient resource allocation) in 
some reasonable proportion to their pre-existing ability to pay. Given its lack of a hard cutoff 
point and its focus on helping all societies manage difficulties and inequalities arising from 
global practices for which no individual peoples are exclusively responsible, this “duty of 
compensation” should be regarded as a separate counterpart to the duty of assistance, which has 
a cutoff point and seeks the reformation of burdened and other non-liberal, non-decent peoples 
into well-ordered peoples.101
As applied to climate change, the duty of compensation should compel peoples to reduce 
some of their greenhouse gas emissions,102 given these emissions’ influence on climate change, 
                                                 
100 Pogge argues this persuasively in World Poverty and Human Rights. Pogge, op. cit., pp. 112-116. 
101 Rawls refers to decent and liberal peoples together as “well-ordered peoples” (p. 4). 
102 I consider the delicate problem of balancing mitigation efforts with adaptation efforts in further detail in my 
upcoming discussions of the currency of justice. For now it is worth observing that the duty of compensation does 
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while remunerating other societies facing climate adaptation burdens for the costs of these 
burdens in some reasonable proportion to their pre-existing ability to pay. Peoples can 
collectively manage both of these components of the duty of compensation in the international 
sphere; in fact, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) does 
just this, enabling nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions within a legally binding 
framework (the Kyoto Protocol) and to assist the global adaptation effort by directing two 
percent of the value of each saleable emissions credit generated through the UNFCCC’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) into an Adaptation Fund created for the purpose of helping 
developing countries adapt to climate change’s impacts.103  
 
5. Advantages and disadvantages of the duty of compensation 
One virtue of the duty of compensation discussed above is its consistency with the second 
original position Rawls uses to model the interests of the world’s peoples from behind the veil of 
ignorance (p. 17). A representative of a people in the original position is unlikely to agree to 
terms of international justice if it appears these terms could leave his citizens to suffer the 
consequences of processes in which they participate minimally, without compensation from 
more significant contributors to these processes. The duty of compensation renders this 
eventuality impossible. A second virtue of the provision is that, in the context of climate change, 
it can help to secure justice in both the international case and the intergenerational case by 
encouraging the maintenance of the CDM’s Adaptation Fund (or something similar) through 
                                                                                                                                                             
not require peoples to mitigate their collective emissions so sharply as to compromise their own abilities to live 
decent lives.  
103 The Adaptation Fund has not yet begun to disburse payments to countries requiring adaptation assistance, but it 
will likely do so before the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period in 2012. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, “Kyoto Protocol,” Official United Nations Site for the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2007, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
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time. Since, as Edward Page notes, the “most vulnerable of all to climate change will be future 
members of developing countries,”104 the Adaptation Fund possesses some promise as an enabler 
of climate adaptation projects in developing countries for the foreseeable future. (It is of course 
difficult to predict how the Adaptation Fund will change, or even whether it will persist, over the 
multi-millennial time scales climate change involves.) 
 A number of criticisms may also be leveled against the proposed “duty of compensation.” 
First, the relative extents to which peoples participate in and sustain harmful institutions like the 
carbon-intensive power and manufacturing industries may be unclear, and thus the amounts of 
their various compensation obligations may be difficult to specify. Furthermore, it may be 
considered problematic that major contributors to the furtherance of these institutions—such as 
China and India, in the case of climate change—might also benefit from other peoples’ 
compensation payments. It seems we can resolve the first of these dilemmas by applying a 
mechanism for collecting and distributing adaptation monies to the basic structure of the 
institutions in question, such that peoples automatically furnish compensation at levels consistent 
with their obligations—through a tax on their interactions with the institutions, for example—
and receive payments from the fund created by their contributions in accordance with the 
decisions of an independent panel. The CDM Adaptation Fund, once operational, will function in 
almost precisely this way: agents generating saleable emissions credits using the CDM will 
contribute (as they currently do) a mandatory two percent of the monetary value of those credits 
to the Fund; an organization105 independent of the UNFCCC will then allocate Fund monies to 
                                                 
104 Page, op. cit., p. 36. 
105 The UNFCCC has not yet chosen an “independent body” to administer payments from the Fund, but likely 
candidates for the duty include the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (a joint initiative of the United 
Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Bank). Bank 
Information Center staff, “World Bank, African Development Bank, UN promote carbon credits for Africa,” website 
of the Bank Information Center, 2006, http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3018.aspx.  
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help build resilience to climate change in countries throughout the world. To the second 
criticism, which questions the use of compensation funds to assist major contributors to the 
harmful institutions in question, I may respond by noting that the intended function of the duty of 
compensation is to give peoples a way of behaving justly when they cannot completely 
dissociate themselves from harmful practices and institutions, as discussed previously. If a 
country is unable to avoid participating in some excessively harmful practice despite 
experiencing damages as a result of the practice, it should not be barred from receiving external 
support in managing these damages so long as it has itself taken steps to provide similar 
compensatory support to other affected peoples. China and India, the world’s most populous 
nations, are both undergoing rapid expansions in their populations and their demand for energy. 
We may request that these nations limit their emissions, but in the short term we can hardly 
expect them to stop emitting altogether, or even to reduce their emissions to negligible levels. If 
these countries were to contribute to such international climate aid initiatives as the CDM 
Adaptation Fund,106 it would be unwise to bar them from receiving assistance from these 
initiatives in times of need.107  
Of course, peoples contributing minimally to the problem should remain eligible for 
assistance whether or not they provide this assistance to other peoples under normal 
circumstances. To make a country’s climate adaptation assistance conditional on its ability to pay 
                                                 
106 It is well known China and India—like the United States—have not agreed to binding national emissions 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and that they therefore do not contribute to the CDM Adaptation Fund. 
The CDM’s principal purpose is admittedly to enable to first-world signatories to the Kyoto Protocol to meet their 
emissions reduction obligations by financing renewable energy installations and other low-carbon development 
projects in the third world. China, India, and other developing countries have made use of the CDM only as 
recipients of externally-financed development projects, and have thus not experienced the usual impetus for 
contributing to the Adaptation Fund. Given China’s particularly large contribution to the climate crisis, however, 
some have called for it to help grow the CDM’s Adaptation Fund despite its status as a developing country. Cape 
Times staff, “Call for big polluters to pay more into ‘adaptation fund,’” from the website of the Cape Times, 
December 5, 2007, http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=4158741. 
107 China and India have very real climate adaptation needs: both would each experience the displacement of tens of 
millions of their citizens in the event of a 1.5-meter climate change-induced sea level rise. Douglas op. cit. 2001.  
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into some fund would strip the duty of compensation provisions of their appeal for countries like 
Bangladesh and, indeed, for all parties to the second original position. 
In the following section, I consider the practice of discounting future benefits and 
burdens from the standpoint of the wide temporal and spatial scope of justice outlined in this 
chapter so far. 
 
D. Discounting climate change: a case study in scope 
As a staple of modern cost-benefit analysis, the social discount rate has a decisive 
influence on how attractive policymakers perceive different policy options to be. The underlying 
assumption of the discount rate is that the present value of a cost or benefit becomes smaller the 
further into the future it occurs; policymakers employ this assumption for a number of practical 
reasons that I will examine later in this section. Using a fixed, annually compounded discount 
rate, one can determine the present value PV of a future benefit (or, alternatively, cost) with the 
formula PV = V / (1+ r)T , where V is the value of the benefit before discounting, r is the discount 
rate, and T is the amount of time that will elapse before the benefit materializes. Using this 
formula, and assuming an annually compounded discount rate of five percent,108 we see that a 
benefit worth $1 billion when it occurs 500 years from now is valued at about two and a half 
cents today. One need not use dollars as the unit of valuation here; human lives function just as 
well, when moral considerations are set aside. At the same discount rate of five percent, one 
billion lives 500 years in the future are worth about one fortieth of one life today.109 Thus, by the 
                                                 
108 A discount rate of five percent is within the normal range for American policymakers: the discount rates used by 
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget are, respectively, two and 
seven percent. Congressional Budget Office staff, “The Economic Effects of Federal Spending on Infrastructure and 
Other Investments,” from the website of the Congressional Budget Office, June 1998, 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=601&type=0. 
109 Lisa Heinzerling used these sample numbers in her Congressional testimony regarding the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). Lisa Heinzerling, “POPs, PIC, and LRTAP: the Role of the 
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logic of discounting, a policy that saves one human life today at the cost of one billion human 
lives 500 years from now can be said to have a positive benefit-cost ratio.  
As the first chapter of this thesis explains, fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, and other 
climate change-inducing human activities entail immediate benefits (like the heating of food and 
water and the opening of new land for grazing and cultivation) that, in many cases, protect 
human life. They also entailed delayed costs—biophysical impacts (like sea level rise and 
stronger hurricanes)—that we can expect to occur on a more or less continuous basis until the 
greenhouse gases emitted through these activities leave the atmosphere. Atmospheric lifetimes 
for greenhouse gases range between five and 50,000 years,110 and many millions of human lives 
would be placed at risk by catastrophic climate impacts like a sudden change to the Atlantic 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC). Thus the projected benefits, costs, and temporal 
scale used for the sample discounting calculation in the last paragraph do not differ dramatically 
from those of climate change itself. Discounting’s relevance for intergenerational climate justice 
is clear. This section examines moral and practical arguments for and against the practice, 
ultimately concluding that its use is unjustified in climate policymaking. 
 
1. Moral arguments about discounting 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls uses the original position to argue that a positive social 
discount rate is not justified by one generation’s preference for its own well-being. His reasoning 
is persuasive from the standpoint of justice as fairness. Since parties to the original position are 
assumed to select principles of justice in accordance with the “universality constraint” previously 
                                                                                                                                                             
United States and Draft Legislation to Implement These International Conventions,” testimony before the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, July 13, 2004, 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/07132004hearing1345/Heinzerling2191.htm. 
110 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001, “Technical Summary,” Climate Change 2001: The Scientific 
Basis, from the website of IPCC Working Group I, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/016.htm. 
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discussed, it appears impossible that they would agree to the use of a policy mechanism that 
assigns more value to the present than it does to the future on the basis of time preference alone. 
I believe this argument has considerable intuitive and logical appeal. As of 2008, policymakers 
in the United States and other powerful nations possess great—probably unprecedented—
influence over future climate change outcomes. But they and we were born into our generation 
by mere contingency, just as those living in 2100 and 3100 will be born into theirs by 
contingency. Why on earth would it be ethical for our generation to enjoy the luxuries of a fossil 
economy at the great expense of those living in 2100 and 3100, if none of us can be held 
responsible for the temporal positions we occupy? 
Rawls offers one hypothetical moral reason to employ a positive social discount rate: to 
reduce time preference by counterbalancing an “extremely high rate of saving which imposes 
excessive hardships on earlier generations.”111 (This is by no means an endorsement of 
discounting qua discounting: Rawls remarks that discounting “has no intrinsic ethical 
appeal.”112) Rawls believes an excessive savings rate is only likely to arise if society is 
employing an “incorrect” conception of the shape and currency of justice, particularly a 
utilitarian conception that “maximizes social utility over time.”113 But if a society does possess 
such a high rate of savings, Rawls believes it may be right to adjust for it using a matching 
discount rate. 
These musings appear to be of little practical use. Rawls provides no indication of how he 
defines “excessive hardships” for earlier generations, thus making it very difficult for 
                                                 
111 Ibid., p. 262. 
112 Ibid., p. 262. 
113 Rawls writes: “Unhappily I can only express the opinion that [social discount rates] simply mitigate the 
consequences of mistaken principles… Having started with the idea that the appropriate rate of saving is the one 
which maximizes social utility over time (maximizes some integral), we may obtain a more plausible result if the 
welfare of future generations is weighted less heavily. Ibid., p. 262. 
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policymakers know the particular circumstances under which Rawls’s conception would 
authorize them to apply a “correcting” social discount rate. Additionally, Rawls’s belief that 
discounting would be an appropriate way of counteracting excessive saving in the modern day 
suffers from at least one flaw. A measure of global warming (along with its attendant biophysical 
impacts) is now unpreventable, but this measure of warming would increase catastrophically if 
the present generation did nothing to reduce its emissions. Therefore just climate policy 
responses will have to include both a reasonably high rate of saving into the future, to secure 
future generations’ ability to adapt to their inevitable climatic burdens, and strong mitigation 
measures. But any policymaker employing a discount rate as a means of counteracting excessive 
saving (which Rawls finds justifiable) would find his mitigation programs less attractive, from a 
cost-benefit standpoint, than they appeared to be before he began discounting, given the discount 
rate’s devaluation of the future benefits provided by the programs. Thus the policymaker would 
face pressure to eliminate mitigation programs rather than reducing the rate of saving. But this 
would be the opposite of the sensible reaction, as Nicholas Stern’s report on the economics of 
climate change confirms: climate mitigation is generally a more cost-effective method of 
protecting future generations than climate adaptation is, and should thus be the last of the two 
policy measures in question to face cuts, not the first.114  
 In “Discounting Climate Change,” Partha Dasgupta admits that he too finds it “hard to 
rebut” the claim that positive discount rates unjustly favor present generations.115  All the same, 
he cites one moral argument (and, as I discuss in the next paragraph, two practical ones) in favor 
of discounting. This is that “rising consumption provides… justification for discounting future 
                                                 
114 Nicholas Stern, “Summary of Conclusions,” STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change, October 30, 
2006, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/9/9/CLOSED_SHORT_executive_summary.pdf. 
115 Dasgupta, “Discounting Climate Change,” p. 15.
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consumption costs and benefits at a positive rate.”116 Dasgupta observes that this increase in 
consumption occurs steadily over time as a consequence of both saving and the net productivity 
of capital, thus conferring a “natural advantage” on later generations vis a vis earlier ones; 
discounting, his reasoning goes, may correct this advantage to make schemes of temporal 
distribution more equitable for the present.117  
 These arguments suffer from a number of flaws. If it were the case that per-capita 
consumption increased over time as a result of saving and interest, Dasgupta might be justified in 
pointing to discounting as a reasonable way of counteracting these increases. In this case one 
could accurately point to an advantaging of future generations over present ones after adjustment 
for generation size. But global-scale per-capita consumption increases are not especially likely to 
occur in the foreseeable future.118 And Dasgupta does not seem to be referring to per-capita 
increases anyway: he speaks simply of “rising consumption,” which I take to mean gross 
consumption.119 Assuming that the world’s population does increase as projected in coming 
years, and that individual people’s material living requirements do not become dramatically 
smaller—both reasonable assumptions, I believe—it seems gross consumption will indeed 
increase, even if per-capita consumption declines somewhat. But I do not believe discounting the 
future on the basis of gross consumption increases alone is legitimate. I assume these 
consumption increases will be required if a growing number of people are to live dignified lives. 
These people’s material needs, which we should not expect to be anything more or less than the 
                                                 
116 Ibid., p. 6. 
117 Ibid., p. 6. 
118 The world’s current population of 6.7 billion people is expected to grow to 9.3 billion people by 2050. Given the 
magnitude of this projected growth and the serious water, food, fuel, and other resource shortages faced by people 
around the world already, it seems inappropriately optimistic to suggest that per-capita consumption will increase in 
the near future. Carl Haub, “2008 World Population Data Sheet,” from the website of the Population Reference 
Bureau, 2008, http://www.prb.org/pdf08/08WPDS_Eng.pdf,  
p. 7. 
119 Dasgupta, “Discounting Climate Change,” p. 6. 
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needs of people living today, should not be held against them in determinations about 
discounting. Neither should the rate at which we expect future generations to grow. “Choice in 
matters of reproduction” is one component of the basic human capability of “bodily integrity,” as 
discussed by Martha Nussbaum; though it is ecologically and socially prudent to limit birth rates 
by empowering and educating women and providing the means of birth control, the decision 
whether to have a child or children is a decision that I (like Nussbaum) believe must ultimately 
rest, as a matter of justice, with each individual couple.120 Moreover, accelerating population 
growth is a matter of simple mathematics as much as (or more than) it is a matter of individual 
reproductive choices. Exponential growth (which human and other animal populations may be 
expected to follow until they begin nearing their material carrying capacities) entails population 
growth that becomes much faster as a given population base becomes larger. The size and 
growth rate of a given generation therefore has much to do with the simple matter of where in 
time that generation falls. And, once again, no generation is responsible for where in time it falls. 
A second objection to Dasgupta’s claim concerns the fact that climate change—a 
phenomenon for which the most climatically burdened future generations will be mostly 
unresponsible—will necessitate future increases in consumption, in the form of adaptation 
expenditures. By discounting in order to “correct” for these increases, we would penalize future 
generations for responding to a problem of our, not their, making. And ironically, we would 
likely also cause them to increase their consumption through our discount rate, quite contrary to 
our initial intentions: as I have written previously, discounting shrinks the present value of future 
benefits, which in this case would mean reducing the financial attractiveness of (and thus 
                                                 
120 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, cited in Jan Garrett, “Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights,” 
Western Kentucky University Working Papers, 2008, http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum.htm. 
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commitment to) present-day mitigation measures among policymakers, thereby increasing the 
measure of climate change to which future generations would have to adapt.  
The foregoing arguments reveal the moral case for discounting (as envisaged by Rawls 
and Dasgupta) to be feeble indeed. But it is Dasgupta who observes that, while it is “all well and 
good for the ethicist to assume the high moral ground and issue instructions like a philosopher-
king… social ethics contains an irremediably democratic element.”121 My thesis is primarily 
concerned with the moral in matters of intergenerational climate change, but discounting in 
particular seems to have its roots in the practical. In the interest of meeting discounting where it 
stands (rather than only where I think it ought to stand), I use the following paragraphs to review 
also practical arguments for the use of discounting. 
 
2. Practical arguments about discounting 
In “Discounting Climate Change,” Dasgupta offers two practical justifications for 
discounting. The first of these is impatience—the notion that “an additional unit of consumption 
tomorrow [is] of less value than an additional unit of consumption today if society is impatient to 
enjoy additional unit now.”122 As Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling note in “Priceless: On 
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing,” the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget has reformulated the impatience problem as the more sophisticated “Keeler-Cretin 
Paradox,” which holds that without a discount rate to prioritize earlier social investments over 
later ones, public utility-maximizing policymakers would delay action ad infinitum in order to 
accumulate as much interest and investment on public monies as possible before spending 
                                                 
121 Ibid., p. 16. 
122 Ibid., p. 6. 
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them.123 Dasgupta’s second practical justification for the use of discounting is the small but 
constant risk of near-term human extinction, which would remove most logical and moral 
barriers to temporally short-sighted behavior.124  
It may seem callous and shallow of us to speak of our “impatience” for goods and 
services as justification for discounting, a practice that seems to contribute so heavily to 
intergenerational inequity. Yet “impatience” with respect to public goods is generally reasonable: 
none of us want to wait indefinitely for our policymakers to build or improve necessary roads, or 
water works, or school systems for our children, nor should we. According to the logic of the 
aforementioned Keeler-Cretin Paradox, however, we will wait indefinitely (in fact infinitely) for 
such goods unless we employ a discount rate to account for our impatience within the process of 
benefit-cost analysis. This is because capital tends to multiply over time as a result of interest 
and investment, and a policymaker possessing a mandate to provide a public good but no clear 
statement of time preference for the good (such as the statement a positive discount rate 
provides) will delay her projects for as long as possible. In this way she will accumulate ever 
more capital, enabling her to furnish the project, at some unreachable future point, such that it 
maximizes benefits to society. Without discounting, the Keeler-Cretin Paradox goes, no public 
good will ever be provided, since the optimal period of time over which to maximize capital 
accumulation is, theoretically, eternity. 
I believe the argument of the Keeler-Cretin Paradox suffers two fatal objections. 
Ackerman and Heinzerling specify the first: in the real-world conditions of a functioning 
democracy, political sentiment would never allow the delays the Keeler-Cretin Paradox 
                                                 
123 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing, pp. 190-
191. 
124 Ibid., p. 18. 
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predicts.125 In discounting’s absence, representatives would simply enact stronger laws to 
prevent governmental bodies from putting off public provision. Discounting is therefore not a 
necessary condition for the avoidance of such delays. Small-government types might argue that 
such anti-delay regulations would compound bureaucratic inefficiencies in governance. But these 
arguments would do nothing to neutralize the serious and unjust harms that discounting would 
otherwise wreak on future generations. I believe (uncontroversially I think126) that matters of 
justice are prior in importance to matters of efficiency.  
A related and equally serious objection to the Keeler-Cretin Paradox argument concerns 
the conception of the good this argument assumes to be in place. Specifically, utilitarianism is 
the only ethical framework under which the Keeler-Cretin Paradox is even coherent. Only by 
seeking the maximization of efficiency without regard for basic rights (particularly, in this case, 
rights to education and other services usually provided by government) could any policymaker 
justify delaying the provision of public goods indefinitely. Rawls thoroughly and convincingly 
debunks such utilitarian conceptions of justice: within these conceptions, he observes that “there 
is no reason in principle... why the violation of liberty [or the rights] of a few might not be made 
right by the greater good shared by many,” and no serious regard for distinctions between 
persons, since the evaluation of any given utility balance can only logically be made from the 
perspective of a “single person whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited 
means.”127  
 As mentioned earlier, a second practical justification for the use of discounting arises 
from the risk that humankind will go extinct within the foreseeable future. If this were to occur, 
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there would no longer be a human future to speak of, and whatever resources had been saved and 
activities foregone in the interest of posterity would prove to have been saved and foregone in 
vain. Referencing the work of Yaari128 and Stern,129 Dasgupta argues that by discounting future 
utilities at the “hazard rate” (that is, the probability of extinction in the foreseeable future) and 
then proceeding with planning and policy as though there is “no chance of extinction,” officials 
can reasonably account for the chance of an extinction-induced annulment of the contract 
between present and future generations. Stern, Dasgupta observes, “has justified the choice of δ 
= 0.1% a year on that very basis” (where δ is the time discount rate).130 131
 I find this line of reasoning novel and mostly sensible, if a little macabre. Since there is a 
chance that humankind will not possess a future after a certain date, there must also be a chance 
that we are wastefully spending time, money, and other resources that could be used to remedy 
present-day ills on intergenerational justice. By worrying as we do about the future, we may by 
some relatively slim chance be committing an injustice in the present, and I believe it is 
appropriate for us to account for this in our planning procedures if we can. 
 What concerns me about discounting for extinction risk has more to do with its potential 
unintended effects than with its underlying justification. It seems to me that any discounting of 
future utilities increases the probability of future extinction. By assigning a little less importance 
to the future—for whatever reason—we provide a little more justification for practices that 
threaten it, especially (for the purposes of this paper) greenhouse gas-intensive practices. Thus 
our efforts to account for extinction risk may become self-fulfilling prophecies of extinction—
                                                 
128 Menachem Yaari, “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 32:2, 1965, pp. 137-158. 
129 Stern, op. cit. 
130 Dasgupta, Discounting Climate Change, p. 18. 
131 Here it is important to note that Dasgupta’s analysis of intergenerational climate justice, like this thesis, is “self-
consciously anthropomorphic:” for argument’s sake, it disregards the future of species other than Homo sapiens, 
even while acknowledging the intrinsic value of these species and nature more generally. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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the fate we humans try (or ought to try) hardest to prevent. On the other hand, small “hazard” 
discount rates like Stern’s increase the risk of future extinction by amounts that are probably 
imperceptible, much on the scale that everyday individual activities like burning wood to heat 
one’s home increase the risk of future extinction. Without having a good idea of either the size of 
these risk increases or the size of the benefits from hazard-based discounting for present-day 
individuals, I do not wish to conclusively endorse or condemn the practice. If it is possible to 
determine the size of these risks and benefits—and I lack the training to determine if it is—then I 
hope future researchers will do so, and weigh the risks against the benefits, before making their 
judgments about the justifiability of hazard-based discounting. If such determinations are not 
possible, then I believe the precautionary principle will have to prevail. And in this case, it seems 
precaution will side against the practice that increases the risk of human extinction. 
 
3. Final thoughts on discounting 
 I began this discussion of discounting with considerable skepticism toward the practice; 
this was manifested in my numerical demonstration of how even a modest discount rate can yield 
vast temporal inequalities over long time scales. The first moral argument I cited against 
discounting—that the time preference it embodies is arbitrary and unjust within the contractual 
framework of Rawls’s original position—is the most powerful condemnation of the practice that 
I know. All of the subsequent moral and practical arguments I posed in favor of discounting 
proved untenable, with the exception of “extinction risk,” which I currently lack the information 
to conclusively support or reject. If it is just, “extinction risk” discounting (as discussed by Stern) 
probably does not admit of a discount rate much higher than 0.1%.132 This is much lower than 
the discount rates employed by authorities like the United States’ Congressional Budget Office 
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and Office of Management and Budget, suggesting that current practice is quite out of touch with 
morality as I have analyzed it here. Unless this disconnect is remedied, I fear the future climate 
damages arising from our discounting procedures will be harsh and unjust indeed. 
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Chapter Three: The Currency of Intergenerational Climate Justice ______________________ 
A. Preliminary remarks 
 
The previous section evaluates and revises Rawls’s efforts to incorporate members of 
generations and societies (“peoples”) other than our own into a shared system for distributing 
advantage and disadvantage. But what, in the context of near- and long-term climate change, are 
the units of advantage and disadvantage we are to distribute? What, in other words, is the 
currency of intergenerational climate justice? This is the question the present chapter considers.  
 With climate justice, as with justice generally, our choice of currencies may have 
important distributive implications. A purely economic interpretation of justice’s currency might 
require us to provide only cash for future generations (assuming the scope of justice we adopt is 
reasonably inclusive of the future). A welfarist approach to currency, by contrast, might require 
us to enable the creation of such positive states as happiness in the minds of future people. The 
distributive differences arising between these interpretations, if implemented, are potentially 
profound: a generation of people taking the economic interpretation, it seems, would disregard 
the non-monetizable impacts of climate change and other environmental problems, exacerbating 
these to an extent that now seems unacceptable in its quest to bequeath more money to the future. 
Acknowledging the crucial impacts people’s surroundings have on their well-being, it seems the 
welfarist interpretation would avoid some of the non-monetizable harms imposed by the 
economic approach while also providing the amounts of cash and tangible resources necessary to 
enable future peoples to maintain positive states of mind. In the context of climate change, it 
seems we must expect policymakers who employ a purely economic currency of justice to do 
relatively little to reduce emissions now, mitigating only to the extent that this will minimize 
clearly monetizable costs (like those associated with large sea level rises) and assuming, as the 
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economists William Nordhaus and Bjorn Lomborg do,133 that the more crucial imperative is to 
grow the monetary resources of future generations by investing in present-day physical and 
human capital. A welfarist approach seems likely to take a heavier emphasis on mitigation, given 
its assumption that even non-monetizable or poorly monetizable costs (like those associated with 
the loss of pristine wilderness due to climatic shifts) can degrade the mental states of future 
human beings. 
 Although these characterizations of economic and welfarist approaches to the currency of 
justice are simplistic, they serve to illustrate a broader point: the effects of our contemporary 
climate policies on future generations may vary considerably with the currencies of justice that 
these policies seek to provide across generations. The selection of the appropriate currency of 
justice, then, is no small matter. What methods might we employ in selecting it? Early in A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls provides an intuitive mechanism—the original position—for evaluating 
propositions of justice. In this section, I use the original position to weigh the proposed 
currencies against each other, following Rawls’s assumption that “one conception of justice is 
more reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if rational persons in the initial 
situation would choose its principles over those of the other for the role of justice.”134  
In an effort to further inform my upcoming comparison of currencies of justice, I 
presently recall the impacts climate change entails for the future, and the source of these impacts: 
as stated in Chapter One, climate change involves the imposition of sea level rise135 and the 
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134 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 15-16. 
135 Bruce Douglas et al., Sea Level Rise: History and Consequences, San Diego: Academic Press, 2001, p. xvii. 
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exacerbation of natural burdens like heat waves136 and hurricanes.137 And climate changing 
behaviors correspond to a considerable extent with basic activities of human survival, including 
(to name just a few) producing and cooking food, transporting oneself and one’s possessions, and 
staying warm. The challenge, then, is one of justly balancing present and future needs against the 
backdrop of a changing but presumably salvageable climate. Such a balance would be impossible 
to strike without some understanding of what these particular needs are. For this reason, the 
following pages critically compares a number of definitions of need—or more, precisely, 
justice’s currency—including the “crude” currencies of “resources,” “welfare,” and 
“opportunities for welfare,” and the more sophisticated currencies of “equal rights” and “vital 
interests” for decent autonomous living (as advocated by Brian Barry), “social primary goods” 
(as advocated by John Rawls), and “basic capabilities to function” (as advocated by Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum).  
 
B. Some simple currencies of justice 
 Resources is one very simple account of justice’s currency. Presumably included in this 
broad category of goods are money, food, clothing, and other staples of survival, along with a 
full range of other basic and luxury items; accordingly, resources may at first glance appear to be 
a practical and usefully general guide to the things that posterity will need to secure its 
reasonable interests, and thus to the currency that present generations behaving justly should 
preserve for posterity. Yet we need only repeat the initial question that guides this discussion of 
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justice’s currency to understand one of the conception’s chief shortcomings: what are the 
benefits and burdens that our account of climate justice seeks to provide? Not all of the 
provisions people and societies will require to appropriately mitigate and adapt to climate change 
are readily categorized as “resources.” Fair distribution of the materials necessary for effective 
climate adaptation is likely to require that individuals possess not only material goods but basic 
political abilities and liberties, including the ability to submit complaints within a governmental 
framework responsive to their needs and the liberty to inhabit (or, if necessary, move to) places 
that are not excessively burdened by climatic effects. Such abilities and liberties are not 
resources, and they are likely to require stable institutions and cultural practices in addition to 
resources if they are to be maintained. 
Additionally, as observed in Chapter One, climate change entails harms that cannot 
always be considered as mere shortages of resources. Heat waves, for instance, are likely to 
become longer, hotter, and more frequent as a consequence of climate change.138 The people 
who suffer and die as a consequence of heat waves do so because their personal biological 
systems, and often the physical and social structures on which they rely,139 experience 
temperature increases so rapid that they cannot adapt to them. With heat waves, as with 
hurricanes, sea level rise, spreading disease vectors, and other climate impacts, the principal 
causes of injury are not resource shortages, but sudden, unmanageable changes in local 
environmental conditions that would not have come into being, or at least not so severely, in the 
absence of climate change. In their failure to account for climate change as a source of harms 
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and as a phenomenon to which people must often adapt using liberties, abilities, and institutions 
as well as resources, resourcist accounts of climate justice’s currency fall short. 
In view of these difficulties, it may seem logical to shift the currency’s focus from 
resources to welfare; such a move seems to draw both harms and non-resource goods like 
institutions and liberties into the fold of its consideration, thereby neutralizing the concerns 
previously discussed. Edward Page distinguishes between conscious-states welfarism and 
success welfarism. In this typology, theories of conscious-states welfarism “hold that welfare 
consists in the presence of certain desirable conscious states,” which can be “’simple,’ as in the 
case of the pleasure a person derives from eating an ice-cream, or ‘complex,’ as in the case of the 
enjoyment a person derives from a tragic novel.”140 Success welfarism, by contrast, regards 
welfare as the extent to which people have fulfilled (or are fulfilling) the deeper objectives of 
their lives. Page regards theories of success welfarism as “superior to conscious-state theories” 
because “they can account for the idea that a person can be low in welfare even if they 
experience pleasurable conscious states” and “also... how people can be well off even if they are 
in temporary pain, such as where a person gives birth or experiences a painful, though 
nevertheless subjectively worthwhile, love affair.”141
Before delving into what are perhaps the most serious flaws facing welfare as a currency 
of justice—what Page and others have called the “cheap tastes” and “expensive tastes” 
problems—it is possible, considering the discussion of the previous paragraph, to observe a more 
general difficulty with the scale at which welfarism seems to target its concern. The difficulty is 
this: both conscious-states welfarism and success welfarism seem preoccupied with the 
experiences of individuals and the states or objectives that these experience fulfill within them. 
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Even if these states and objectives were precisely the stuff of which high-quality human lives are 
composed (which, as I discuss in the coming section about the complex currency of capabilities, 
they probably are not), it seems an emphasis on the internal states and objectives of individuals 
cannot provide a clear sense of one generation’s obligations to another in the context of climate 
change. There is no telling what preferences those living 50, 500, or 5,000 years in the future 
might possess; more significantly, it is impossible to say with much accuracy or precision how 
the actions of the present generation will affect the ability of these future individuals to fulfill 
their preferences, given the vast and uncertain range of impacts different contemporary actions 
might have on future climatic effects. (Here it is worth recalling the “uncertainty explosions” 
discussed by Stephen Schneider and Janica Lane in Chapter One.142) The welfarist currency 
seems to take a microscopic view of the ways in which climate change’s distributive outcomes 
affect people, and though this view may be useful at the level of interactions between 
individuals, it is much too fine and much too narrow to be of use at the level of the more distant 
and ambiguous interactions between generations in the context of climate change. This is a 
difficulty that will reappear later in this chapter; for now, however, let us consider more directly 
the critical flaws that cripple welfare as an account of the currency of justice. 
Welfarist theories, in both their “conscious states” and their “success” varieties, suffer 
from a set of more serious shortcomings: the “cheap tastes” and “expensive tastes” problems. 
Underlying these concerns is the basic observation that initial distributions of “welfare” 
necessarily affect people’s preferences. A rich American who develops fetishistic obsessions 
with expensive food and clothing, prestigious university degrees and professional positions, and 
other trappings of privilege may only be capable of maximizing his “conscious states” welfare 
and “success” welfare through vast monetary expenditures. An impoverished Nigerian who 
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comes to find inexpensive cassava dishes deeply satisfying, and who, possessing little else to 
distract him, develops powerful connections to his family and his community may experience 
levels of both “conscious states” welfare and “success” welfare equivalent to those enjoyed by 
the American, at a fraction of the cost. The American and the Nigerian may be said to have 
“expensive tastes” and “cheap tastes,” respectively. Do the different “welfare functions” of these 
individuals justify the vastly different levels of spending required to satisfy each of them? In 
other words, are the requirements of justice met once the American and the Nigerian have 
attained equivalent levels of welfare, even if the resources they enjoy (by contingency of birth, 
not merit or fault) are completely unequal? Problematically, the welfarist accounts seem to 
answer “yes.” 
The “tastes” problems are of particular relevance for intergenerational climate justice. If 
the next few centuries yield climate changes that are disruptive and environmentally harmful but 
not suddenly cataclysmic, it seems quite possible that “members of later generations might adapt 
to their degraded surroundings by learning not to desire so intensely access to clean air”143 and 
other goods while making peace with the shorter life expectancies that may have resulted from 
heat waves, hurricanes, droughts, malaria epidemics, and other climatically exacerbated 
difficulties. Under such conditions, and with such coping mechanisms, those living several 
centuries from now might come to experience levels of welfare equivalent to the ones we enjoy 
today, despite living on a planet that is by our standards considerably less inhabitable. Once 
again, welfarist currencies of justice seem to regard the lots of people possessing degraded sets 
of resources and opportunities as being equivalent, for purposes of distributive comparison, to 
the lots of people possessing undiminished resources and opportunities so long as each group 
experiences equal amounts of welfare. In addition to seeming quite out of sync with our 
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intuitions, the welfarist system is unworkable from the standpoint of distributive justice, since 
“welfare” is not and cannot be quantifiable, and is thus almost impossible to compare between 
individuals, much less temporally distant generations. 
In recognition of the “tastes” problems, some theorists have advocated for the use of 
opportunity for welfare, not welfare itself, as the morally significant intergenerational 
currency.144 Page contends that, in the context of intergenerational climate justice, the “cheap 
tastes” problem is as applicable to “welfare opportunism” as it is to “welfarism.” Page refers in 
particular to the difficulties of climate adaptation, demonstrating how efforts to enable future 
generations to thrive within the constraints of a severely altered climate might, if successful, 
create “generations of persons who look on their environment in a similar way to [that in which] 
Tiny Tim views his disability,” enjoying “neither less welfare, nor less opportunity for welfare, 
than their ancestors despite enjoying a worsened natural resource base.”145 Page’s argument 
seems off. I believe we must assume categorically that a person with more resources (and fewer 
burdens) than another person enjoys a range of prospects preferable to the range enjoyed by the 
other, less well-endowed person. The less well-endowed person can always tweak her approach 
to living to maximize her utility within her particular set of constraints, but the better-endowed 
person can do the same thing in greater measure, insofar as the constraints she faces are not as 
severe as those faced by her peer. So, though it may always be possible (though perhaps highly 
difficult) for a climatically burdened generation to improve its welfare under current conditions 
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through adaptation, such improvements are unnecessary or at the very least equally attainable for 
the present generation. Consequently, relative inequality of opportunities for welfare persists. 
 This refutation of Page’s argument may appear to salvage “welfare opportunism” as a 
legitimate currency of justice. I believe the approach suffers from a more serious flaw. As 
mentioned briefly in the foregoing paragraph on welfarism, the emphasis on human welfare as 
justice’s ultimate aim—welfare that is experienced solely and subjectively at the level of the 
individual—seems to imply a microscopic view of justice’s currency. Welfare opportunism’s 
“opportunity” provision generalizes the currency’s focus away from the subjective level of 
individuals, who experience welfare via their own unique welfare functions, and toward the 
objective, quantifiable resources and liberties all people utilize in experiencing welfare. But this 
generalization neither removes welfare opportunism’s ultimate emphasis on individual-level 
welfare nor provides any level of specificity about the kinds of resources, rights, and liberties 
that are required to enable individuals to secure welfare. Welfare opportunism thus occupies an 
uncomfortable middle ground between the microscopic and the macroscopic, failing to provide 
an intuitive guide to intergenerational climate justice’s currency at either scale. As we shall see, 
Rawls’s social primary goods approach provides a much clearer notion of the currency of 
intergenerational climate justice at the macroscopic scale—the only scale at which people living 
in the blinded present can envision the likely long-term climatic effects of their polluting 
activities—while Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities and functionings approach provides a clearer 
of notion of the currency of justice at the microscopic level of climate adaptation and economic 
development. Welfare opportunism’s chief flaw, then, has less to do with the “cheap tastes” 
problem than with the indeterminacy of the scale at which it is applicable. 
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C. Sophisticated currencies of justice 
 Briefly setting aside the aforementioned concerns about scale, this section considers a 
group of approaches to the currency of justice that I consider more sophisticated than resourcism, 
welfarism, and welfare opportunism. These are John Rawls’s “social primary goods,” Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities and functionings,” and Brian Barry’s “vital interests.”  
 
1. Social primary goods 
 
At several points in A Theory of Justice, Rawls discusses requirements of 
intergenerational justice that can seemingly only fall within the category of justice’s currency. 
For instance, in outlining his “just saving principle” (which he finds necessary given the “present 
time of entry interpretation” and subsequent risk that, following the difference principle alone, 
the parties to the original position might “favor [the least advantaged members of] their 
generation by refusing to make any sacrifices at all for their successors”146), Rawls asserts that 
Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain 
intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each 
period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. This saving may take 
various forms from net investment in machinery and other means of production to 
investment in learning and education.147
 
Earlier, Rawls observes that “questions of social justice” arise not only within generations but 
also “between generations… for example, the question of the appropriate rate of capital saving 
and of the conservation of natural resources and the environment of nature… [and] the question 
of a reasonable genetic policy.” Rawls discusses these “questions,” which seem to point readily 
to specific elements of his proposed currency of intergenerational justice, in an effort to justify 
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his decision to extend the veil of ignorance by obscuring from the parties in the original position 
all information about the generations to which they belong.148
 At first glance, then, Rawls’s currency of intergenerational justice includes “the gains of 
culture and civilization,” “just institutions,” monetary, infrastructural, and cultural “capital,” 
“natural resources,” and “a reasonable genetic policy.” This seems a useful preliminary index of 
the things the present generation owes to the future, but does it differ in any meaningful way 
from the basic currency of resources refuted in the last section? If the aforementioned items were 
the only components of Rawls’s currency of justice, the answer would indeed be “no.” Rawls’s 
currency of justice, however, is vastly more developed than this simple index of 
intergenerational goods reveals. The following paragraphs outline the origins and specifications 
of the “social primary goods,” which are the basis of Rawls’s currency. 
The foundations of Rawls’s account of justice lie with the two principles of justice he 
outlines in §46 of his Theory of Justice: first, that “each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all,” 
and, second, that 
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and  
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.149
 
These principles are “ranked in lexical order” such that efforts to secure compliance with the 
second principle are legitimate only if they do not compromise compliance with the first; in other 
words, “basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of [greater overall] liberty,” not for the 
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sake of improving the material well-being of any group or individual.150 The two principles, 
which Rawls believes are those that free, reasonable, rational, equal parties would select to 
govern their society from the standpoint of the original position,151 provide a preliminary sense 
of the currency of justice that Rawls believes society must distribute. 
 Rawls finds it necessary to specify some “objective grounds” for comparisons of 
individuals’ levels of advantage, comparisons that society must inevitably make if it is to adhere 
to the difference principle. Indeed, he writes, “these estimates cannot be left to our unguided 
intuition.” To provide these “objective grounds,” Rawls offers a set of “social primary goods,” 
which are consistent with the general sense of justice he outlines via the two principles. The 
goods are general by design; Rawls notes that it would be “unreasonable to demand great 
precision” in outlining such goods, given the veil of ignorance, which obscures not only the 
parties’ positions in the society they are to inhabit but also their individual conceptions of the 
good.152 (These conceptions, if they became known to the parties in the original position, might 
lead the parties to adopt governing principles biased toward their own preferences, in violation of 
the different but reasonable beliefs that others in their society might possess.) Consequently, 
Rawls specifies that the social primary goods are “things which it is supposed a rational man 
wants whatever else he wants,” or, in other words, “things which he [will] prefer more of rather 
than less” no matter what specific “rational plans” he possesses.153 It is in this sense that the 
goods are “primary.” 
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 What are the social primary goods? In A Theory of Justice, Rawls initially groups them 
into two “broad categories:” first, “rights, liberties, and opportunities,” and, second, “income and 
wealth” and the “rights and prerogatives of authority.” The goods are “social” in view of the role 
society must play in providing them; indeed, writes Rawls, “liberties and opportunities are 
defined by the rules of major institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is regulated 
by them.”154 Later in the work, Rawls also provides a detailed discussion of the “social basis of 
self-respect,” which he considers the most important primary good of all; I discuss this third 
good and its components shortly. Rawls does not discuss in much detail his initial decision to 
group the social primary goods into two categories, but his later comments make the distinction 
between them clear enough. The first category—“rights, liberties, and opportunities”—comprises 
things that individuals simply possess or simply lack, and which do not lend themselves to 
accumulation (and thus unequal distribution) in the way that material resources do. The second 
category—“income and wealth,” and the “rights and prerogatives of authority”—contains goods 
that “vary in their distribution.”155  
A third and separate primary good, which Rawls considers “most important,” is self-
respect, without which “nothing may seem worth doing… [and] all desire and activity becomes 
empty and vain.”156 The “social basis of self-respect” consists in both “a person’s sense of his 
own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth 
carrying out,” and “a confidence in one’s ability… to fulfill one’s intentions.”157 As Amartya 
Sen observes, and as I discuss shortly, Rawls thusly “motivates [his] focus on primary goods by 
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discussing what the primary goods enable people to do;”158 in this regard, the elements of 
Rawls’s currency that involve self-respect seem to draw more from the “capabilities and 
functionings” approach of Sen and Martha Nussbaum than they do from the broader currency of 
“goods” to which Rawls claims to subscribe. This would please Sen and Nussbaum considerably 
if Rawls’s notion of justice’s currency did not address capabilities and functionings in what they 
judge to be an “incomplete, vacillating, and misleading way.”159 The following sections explore 
this and other critiques Sen and Nussbaum level against Rawls’s currency of social primary 
goods; later, they examine some divergent and seldom-discussed features of the philosophers’ 
basic approaches that seem to render Sen and Nussbaum’s claims irrelevant. 
 
2. Capabilities 
 In the landmark lecture “Equality of What?”, Sen famously criticizes Rawls’s currency of 
social primary goods for the “element of ‘fetishism’” it contains. Rawls, Sen notes, “takes 
primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship 
between persons and goods.”160 Relatedly, he fears that Rawls’s critique of utility as a parameter 
of justice is too harsh; “while utility in the form of happiness or desire-fulfillment may be an 
inadequate guide” to justice, Sen writes, “the Rawlsian framework asserts it to be irrelevant… 
which is, of course, a much stronger claim.”161 Though Sen shares Rawls’s reservations about 
the utilitarian currency of justice—utility—he also believes utility, in the forms of “happiness” 
and “desire-fulfillment” (which are analogous to the aforementioned currencies of “conscious-
states welfare” and “success welfare”), may constitute at least a small piece of the currency that 
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161 Ibid., p. 216. 
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justice should seek to provide for people. More importantly, Sen implies that Rawls’s rejection 
of utility stems from an essential unwillingness to look beyond goods to the effects these goods 
have on people.162 Sen finds this stubbornness problematic. 
 As an alternative to Rawls’s currency of social primary goods, Sen proposes a currency 
of “basic capabilities,” where a “capability reflects a freedom to choose between [both] 
alternative lives”163 and alternative actions, including moving freely, being nourished, being 
clothed and housed, and “participating in the social life of the community.”164 Sen finds this 
approach preferable to all currencies of goods—even currencies that include non-material goods 
like rights and liberties—since such currencies necessarily focus on “good things” to the neglect 
of “what these good things do to human beings.”165 As mentioned previously, Sen believes 
currencies of utility do focus on goods’ effects on people, but argues—rightly, I think—that it is 
impossible to construct a utilitarian currency that does not fail before the “cheap tastes” and 
“expensive tastes” objections. Though Sen does not explicitly address equality of opportunity for 
welfare in “Equality of What?”, if we interpret “opportunity” as a largely material construct—
that is, if we believe (as I think we must) that one person cannot be said to have the same 
opportunities for welfare as another person if one enjoys an abundance of food while the other 
starves for the lack of it—then Sen’s objection to the “fetishism” of Rawls’s social primary 
goods approach seems to apply also to equality of opportunity for welfare.  
What are the distributive implications of adopting Sen’s currency of capabilities rather 
than Rawls’s currency of social primary goods? Sen acknowledges that the distributive outcomes 
of the use of his approach would differ minimally from those of Rawls’s approach “if human 
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beings were very like each other.”166 In reality, he argues, people differ significantly in their 
abilities to convert goods into valuable mental states and functionings, and their differences track 
along both societal and individual lines. As David Crocker puts it, “the clothing that promotes 
basic functioning differs in the rainforests of Costa Rica and the tundra of Alaska,”167 just as the 
nutritional requirements of any individual woman differ from those of her newborn child. A 
system of justice that seeks to distribute goods without considering the uses of those goods from 
society to society and individual to individual may crucially misestimate what packages of goods 
to provide in particular places. Following the 2004 tsunami that struck southeast Asia, for 
instance, “inappropriate aid” undermined the international response considerably: relief agencies 
sent canned pork to heavily Muslim Aceh, Indonesia, and bulky sweaters to sweltering southern 
India.168 Sen’s currency of basic capabilities requires that providers of justice consider, with as 
much resolution as possible, the items and positive and negative freedoms (that is, both freedoms 
to do certain things and freedoms not to have certain burdens imposed) that people need to 
acquire basic human capabilities. For Sen, these capabilities, not the goods that provide for them, 
are the ultimate ends of justice. 
Sen’s account of the currency of justice is both plausible and question-begging: if justice 
consists in basic capabilities, what exactly are these basic capabilities? Though Sen 
acknowledges that “the issue of the indexing of the basic capability bundles is a serious one,” he 
states that the lecture “Equality of What?” is “not the occasion to go into the technical issues 
involved such an indexing.”169  
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It is here that Martha Nussbaum comes to Sen’s aid, summarizing the question that 
exercises both of them in their quest for an accurate index of the most basic human capabilities: 
We must ask which things are so important that we will not count a life as a human life 
without them?170
 
In response to this question, Nussbaum advances a set of “basic capabilities,” which she believes 
are innate to healthy people, and which she distinguishes from “internal capabilities”—
capabilities that people build through training—and “combined capabilities”—internal 
capabilities made actionable by the presence of certain external conditions, such as, for example, 
the freedom to elect one’s political representatives.171 (In this example of a combined capability, 
the internal capability in question is that of comparing and expressing preferences for potential 
representatives, an activity that is of little direct practical value if one does not also enjoy the 
underlying opportunity to vote these preferences in a free, fair election.) Nussbaum lists the 
following ten “basic capabilities:” 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length . . . ; not dying 
prematurely. 
2. Bodily health. . . . Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; 
being adequately nourished . . . ; being able to have adequate shelter . . .  
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault . . . ; having opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction  
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to 
think, and to reason--and to do these things in . . . a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education . . . ; being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing, and producing expressive works and events of one's own choice . . . ; being 
able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able 
to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain  
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; 
being able to love those who love and care for us; being able to grieve at their absence, to 
experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one's emotional developing 
blighted by fear or anxiety. . . .  
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6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of 
conscience.)  
7. Affiliation. Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being 
able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having 
the capability for both justice and friendship. . .  Being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others.  
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control over one's environment. (A) Political: being able to participate effectively 
in political choices that govern one's life; having the rights of political participation, free 
speech and freedom of association . . . (B) Material: being able to hold property (both 
land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others . . . 172
 
Sen and Nussbaum believe these capabilities are “culturally invariant;” in other words, any 
human being may be called deprived if he or she lacks any of the ten listed capabilities. (Again, 
Sen and Nussbaum believe the packages of goods required to secure these capabilities do vary, at 
both the individual and cultural levels.) 
 Sen and Nussbaum’s currency of capabilities has stimulated some controversy. Gerald 
Cohen, for instance, believes capabilities imply an inappropriately “athletic” conception of the 
substance of decent human life, citing the examples of babies and incapacitated adults who 
receive nourishment passively in the form of hospital feeding tubes. Despite the fact of their 
nourishment, Cohen believes the capabilities approach places these babies and adults beneath its 
threshold for decent living, since neither the babies nor the adults are “able” to feed themselves. 
Consequently, Cohen embraces a currency of “midfare,” so called because it is “posterior to 
having goods and prior to having utility.”173 He includes in his definition of midfare the 
“capabilities properly so called” that goods give to people, the “valuable activities… and 
                                                 
172 Ibid., pp. 41-42, cited in Jan Garrett, “Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights,” Western Kentucky 
University Working Papers, 2008, http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum.htm. 
173 Gerald Cohen, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” The Quality of Life, eds. Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum, 1993, p. 18. 
 74
desirable states” that people engage in by exercising these capabilities, and the desirable states 
that goods cause “directly, without any exercise of capability on the part of their beneficiary.” 
For this last variety of midfare, Cohen provides an example with relevance for climate change: 
the average resident of the average developed country, he observes, enjoys freedom from malaria 
not because she has herself exercised any capability, but because “others have destroyed the 
malaria-causing insects” for her. Cohen fears that Sen’s currency of justice fails to account for 
such vital states of being, which the individual person “neither brought about nor ever was in a 
position to bring about.”174 In light of Cohen’s example, it seems a currency of intergenerational 
climate justice that failed to account for those benefits that governments and other institutions 
provide unconditionally for people—that is, without requiring any exercise of “capability” by 
these people—would indeed be flawed. 
 
a. Misreadings: reconciling currencies of justice in the immediate and distant future 
Despite its relevance for the context of climate change, Cohen’s objection seems to 
necessitate, at most, minor revisions to Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. In his 
response to Cohen’s critique, Sen in fact argues that the term “capability,” in its common usage, 
accounts for passive advantages like malaria avoidance: 
The fact that a person has the freedom to enjoy a malaria-free (or, to put it slightly 
differently, that his choice of a malaria-free life is feasible) may be entirely due to the 
actions of others... but that does not compromise the fact that he can indeed have a 
malaria-free life and has the capability (thanks largely to others) to achieve such a life.175
 
With a little linguistic flexibility, Sen and Nussbaum’s approach is made to incorporate all of the 
advantages that people might require to maintain the basic capabilities previously listed. Cohen’s 
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objection thus seems trivial, and his currency of midfare too similar to Sen and Nussbaum’s 
much more developed currency to justify a switch. 
 At the microscopic level of the individual, I believe the capabilities approach is a finer 
and more accurate guide to justice than Rawls’s currency of social primary goods. The hungry 
victim of a climatically exacerbated future crop failure will indeed need “income and wealth” 
and “natural resources” if he is to acquire enough food to survive, but these categories will prove 
vague to the point of uselessness when it comes time to feed him. The particular food items the 
victim will need to survive, and the particular political rights and amounts of money he will need 
to acquire them, will necessarily depend on his individual and cultural circumstances. Sen and 
Nussbaum acknowledge this, emphasizing only that determinations about these particular needs 
must proceed with the satisfaction of capabilities as their objective. In the context of climate 
justice, Sen and Nussbaum’s currency appears to have an important role to play. By specifying 
the objective of adaptation to climate impacts—that is, the fulfillment of people’s capabilities to 
achieve functionings despite these impacts—Sen and Nussbaum’s currency can ensure that aid is 
both sensitive to the particular needs of impacted populations and comprehensive in its effort to 
provide individuals of these populations with all ten of the basic capabilities outlined earlier in 
this chapter. The attractiveness of the currency of capabilities is evidenced by the fact that 
institutions working to facilitate development and climate change adaptation have already 
incorporated capability fulfillment into their objectives. According to Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, the 
capabilities approach provided the “conceptual foundation” of the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human Development Index, which has come to rival per-capita gross domestic 
product as a measure of development. Sen has helped the Programme produce its annual Human 
 76
Development Reports since it began publishing them in 1990.176 A browse of the World Bank’s 
“Rural Institutions and Adaptation to Climate Change” program website reveals that the 
capabilities approach has influenced also the discourse of climate adaptation.177 This is 
unsurprising, since the primary tasks of climate adaptation—building institutional capacity and 
improving infrastructure, to name a few—differ minimally from those of traditional development 
work.  
But the revelations of Sen and Nussbaum do not render Rawls’s currency useless. In 
particular, the currency of social primary goods seems well-adapted for considerations about just 
climatic interactions between the present and the relatively distant future, which must consist 
largely of efforts to mitigate climate-changing activities.178
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Rawls derives his currency from the perspective of the original position, in which the 
deliberating parties lack particular knowledge of the society whose principles they must select. 
His decision to add this “veil of ignorance” arises from his desire for a society in which all 
people can live according to their own “rational plans of life.”179 Rawls’s social primary goods 
are thus designed for broad utility, not the fulfillment of specific needs; they are the “things that 
every rational man is presumed to want,”180 “whatever else he wants.”181  
With respect to the distant future, the generation now living occupies a position similar to 
that of the parties in Rawls’s original position. Those of us living today cannot say with any 
specificity what needs and conceptions of the good the world’s peoples will possess in one 
hundred years, nor can we determine exactly which sets of goods, liberties, and opportunities 
these peoples will enjoy. Our climate-changing activities will certainly affect future distributions 
of burdens and benefits, but it is unknowable to us precisely how. Already human-induced 
climate change is triggering natural responses in the world, including hotter, longer, and more 
frequent heat waves, more intense hurricanes, cyclones, and high sea events (including 
tsunamis), and wider-reaching droughts and disease outbreaks.182 At the most, scientists can 
predict malaria outbreaks four months before they strike.183 They can predict droughts up to one 
month in advance;184 hurricanes and cyclones, up to five days in advance;185 and heat waves, up 
                                                                                                                                                             
adaptive capacity without also pursuing mitigation would be to saddle the future with massive logistical (if not 
economic) headaches for which the present, not the future, would be responsible.  
Evidently, then, an intergenerationally just climate policy must combine both mitigation efforts and 
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to 60 hours in advance.186 (Tsunamis, which scientists expect to yield larger impacts as the 
climate warms and sea levels rise, arise from fundamentally unpredictable ocean-floor 
earthquakes, and are thus almost impossible to forecast.187) Beyond the next days, weeks, and 
months, then, we can only refer to climate change’s future impacts in the language of broad 
trends. We know our actions today are triggering biophysical responses that will harm people in 
the future; we cannot say precisely who these responses will harm, or when, or how, or where 
they will harm them. The language of capabilities and functionings, with its emphasis on 
tailoring development solutions to the particular needs of specific populations, is thus ill-suited 
for considering the obligations of those living today to these yet-unspecified future people. 
Rawls’s currency of social primary goods provides a level of generality that is consistent with 
our merely general knowledge of the needs future climate change will threaten. 
What I am proposing is that we should adopt for our considerations about 
intergenerational climate justice two currencies—Sen and Nussbaum’s basic capabilities to 
function at the microscopic individual scale on which adaptation must occur, and Rawls’s social 
primary goods at the more macroscopic scale at which mitigation must occur—even if we 
believe (as I do) that basic capabilities to function ultimately provide the most accurate account 
of the currency of justice. At the macroscopic scale of mitigation, an exclusive focus on 
capabilities to function would not bring us any nearer to understanding what justice requires us 
to provide for future people than a focus on social primary goods would, since the particular 
needs and vulnerabilities of future people remain to be determined. And problematically, the 
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phrase “capabilities to function” does not come as close to describing the resources, institutions, 
and other crucial goods that climate change threatens as Rawls’s currency of social primary 
goods does. Indeed, it is impossible to consider how climate change threatens future capabilities 
without turning first to the resources, institutions, and goods it threatens and, next, to the ways in 
which absences of these goods might undermine future capabilities. Taking goods as the 
currency of intergenerational climate justice may be “fetishistic” (insofar as the ultimate 
objective of justice is capability fulfillment), but it is also consistent with the realities of climate 
change, the real, physical ways in which it threatens people. 
As time progresses, of course, projections that were once general and uncertain give way 
to tangible occurrences. The climatically strengthened hurricanes predicted for years by global 
circulation models suddenly strike land, creating new human needs that, for all their previous 
unknowability, are vivid and terrible. It is here that the focus on capability fulfillment becomes 
necessary. But is such a focus perhaps also necessary before such things occur? The answer, it 
seems to me, is yes, since place-specific preparation improves responses to both sudden disasters 
and gradual changes in, for instance, food growing conditions. We must therefore ask when the 
focus on general goods might give way to the focus on capabilities. It is impossible to provide a 
single unconditional answer to this question. “As soon as possible” is one conceivable response, 
but it is quite unsatisfying given the many different things peoples must spend their time and 
resources on besides adaptation to climate change. “As soon as profitable” seems a better 
answer, where “profitable” means that an adaptation response’s likely benefits outweigh its 
likely costs. For example, efforts to stock a coastal city in Bangladesh with extensive emergency 
rations of food, water, medicine, and clothing—all of them tailored as best as possible to the 
purpose of satisfying individual and collective capabilities within that particular population—
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would seem profitable; devastating hurricanes have struck Bangladesh before and will strike it 
again, creating significant new demands for stockpiled items when they do. Creating such 
stockpiles in landlocked agrarian countries to prepare for droughts that may by a slim chance 
occur there in, say, a hundred years would seem less profitable; it would be more sensible to wait 
until greater certainty exists about the particular places and periods these droughts will affect 
before establishing extensive stockpiles in such places. In the meantime, countries like these 
might instead concentrate a greater share of their resources on reducing emissions, which is a 
necessarily goods-focused (rather than capabilities-focused) endeavor.  
This is not to say these countries should not consider other sorts of adaptation initiatives 
in the short term; human-induced climate change began some time ago, and there is nary a 
country in the world that does not have one climatically-exacerbated natural threat or another to 
worry about. Consequently, for most populations the question is not whether to select the 
adaptation-oriented lens of capabilities or the mitigation-oriented lens of social primary goods, 
but rather how heavily to employ each lens in its considerations about climate action.  
The “profitability” criterion, as I have defined it, is surely question-begging. For starters, 
what exactly does the phrase “likely benefits” mean? How “likely” do an action’s potential 
benefits have to be before one can say that they outweigh its more certain costs? This is a heavily 
loaded question, and it would be impossible to answer it exhaustively here. Multiplying the 
potential costs and benefits of an action by the likelihood of their occurrence and then comparing 
the probability-weighted costs with the probability-weighted benefits is one simple but effective 
approach to decisionmaking under uncertainty. As long as it is accompanied by a Rawlsian or 
similarly contractual consideration about the justice of the distribution of costs and benefits, and 
so long as it is not accompanied by a present-oriented temporal discount rate, I see no reason to 
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call it unjust. The much harder problem facing the probabilistic approach, it seems, is that of 
assigning values to potential costs and benefits in the first places. What price are we to place on a 
human life? What price on freedom? I make no assertions here about whether such questions are 
morally legitimate, though if they are I side with Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling in 
contending that ethical arguments, not utilitarian market valuation techniques, must specify the 
answers.188  
There are surely other solutions, rooted in economics and public policy studies, to the 
problems of policymaking under uncertainty. I cannot address them here; my primary assertion 
for the present section is that the capabilities approach and the social primary goods approach 
can serve as effective lenses for considering intergenerational obligations of, respectively, 
adaptation and mitigation. My secondary assertion is that it is possible and likely necessary to 
specify a balance between the two approaches, much as one specifies thicknesses of glass in a 
pair of bifocals. The preliminary basis of “profitability,” outlined above, can help guide this act 
of balancing, though I leave it to future researchers to demonstrate precisely how. 
Another problem remains. Rawls’s currency of social primary goods does focus more 
directly than Sen and Nussbaum’s currency of capabilities on those relatively tangible goods and 
resources—natural resources, rights, liberties, and opportunities, and so forth—that climate 
change threatens directly. But it is still too vague to be serviceable in any process of determining 
whether particular tradeoffs between benefits and burdens experienced in the present and the 
future are just. To say that climate change threatens “natural resources,” for instance, is 
tantamount to saying nothing at all; to provide a workable prescription for an ethical climate 
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policy, one must delve with as much specificity as the mists of time allow into the kinds of 
natural resources climate change threatens, the value of these threatened resources to human 
beings, and the probability that the threat to these resources will give way to actual destruction. 
(This third question—the question of probability—is a challenge that I leave to future 
researchers to sort out.) It is here that Brian Barry’s discussion of sustainability and 
intergenerational justice becomes useful.  
 
3. Vital interests 
 In the essay “Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice,” Brian Barry contends that the 
present generation owes future people, as a requirement of justice, “the opportunity to live good 
lives according to their conception of what constitutes a good life.” Thus, he argues, the currency 
of justice “needs to be read as some notion of equal opportunity across generations.”189 Barry 
finds it impossible to spell out what such opportunities would ideally enable future generations to 
do, be, or experience without calling forth his own personal opinions on what matters most in 
life; to do so would be clearly inappropriate, in his view, given that “one of the defining 
characteristics of human beings is their ability to form their own conceptions of the good life.”190 
Barry’s desire to remain general in defining the “opportunities” to be distributed between 
generations is consistent with both the general knowledge we possess about future climate 
impacts and the logic of Rawls's veil of ignorance. But his efforts to remain appropriately 
general do not prevent him from specifying (in somewhat greater detail than Rawls does) the 
basic material contents of “equal opportunity:” 
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…we cannot imagine in any detail what may be thought of as a good life in the future. 
But we can be quite confident that it will not include the violation of what I have called 
vital interests: adequate nutrition, clean drinking water, clothing and housing, health care 
and education, for example.191
 
In the context of intergenerational climate justice, Barry’s “vital interests” offer a link between 
Rawls’s currency of social primary goods and Sen and Nussbaum’s currency of capabilities, 
insofar as these “vital interests” are general enough to cohere with our general current knowledge 
of future climate impacts while simultaneously being directly connected to the human 
capabilities—nourishment (via “adequate nutrition”), bodily health (via “clean drinking water, 
clothing, and housing, [and] health care”), and the exercise of sense and thought (via 
“education”), among other things—whose fulfillment I believe ultimately constitutes justice. 
Unlike Rawls, who selects resources and institutions for inclusion in his index of social primary 
goods on the basis of whether or not the hypothetical “rational man” would want them “whatever 
else he wants,”192 Barry chooses the items that all people need, the items that are “vital” in any 
pursuit of a decent human life. This is a small but salient distinction; it demonstrates that Barry’s 
currency falls closer to that of capabilities than Rawls’s does. 
 Barry’s currency of “vital interests” is also more clearly and readily connectable than 
either capabilities or social primary goods with the real-world impacts we expect climate change 
to produce. As mentioned previously, it is not human capabilities that climate change threatens, 
but the resources and institutions that enable these capabilities’ fulfillment; thus capabilities 
themselves fail to provide a suitable lens for understanding what is unjust about climate change, 
even if capability fulfillment is (and I believe it is) the proper aim of justice at the level of the 
individual. Rawls’s currency of social primary goods surpasses capabilities insofar as it consists 
directly of resources, institutions, freedoms. But, given the vagueness of the categories into 
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which Rawls groups the social primary goods, these goods admit of only broad-brush 
characterizations about the likely effects of climate change on future individuals. Indeed, it is 
impossible to consider how climate change actually harms people without first breaking Rawls’s 
non-descript categories of goods, such as “natural resources,” or “rights, liberties, and 
opportunities,” into the more tangible goods and institutions of which they are composed, and 
which climate change actually threatens—like clean drinking water, as an example of a clearly 
necessary good from the category of “natural resources,” or the right to receive disaster relief 
(during a hurricane or heat wave, for instance) from a reasonably responsive government, as an 
example of a good from the category of “rights, liberties, and opportunities.” Barry describes his 
“vital interests” in such tangible, climate change-relevant terms, and though this does not 
differentiate his currency of justice from Rawls’s in any dramatic way—both are, ultimately, 
speaking of basic, intrinsically desirable goods, rights, liberties, and institutions—I believe it 
renders it superior for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
D. Currency in review 
In this chapter, I have explored both simple and sophisticated accounts of justice’s 
currency—the actual stuff in whose distribution justice and injustice consist—in the context of 
long-term climate change. The “simple” currencies of resources, welfare, and opportunities for 
welfare suffer from flaws that I believe make them unsuitable guides to intergenerational climate 
justice. Resources fails to account for liberties and rights and, particularly relevant for the matter 
of climate change, harms—two non-material categories items that, despite their relative 
intangibility, powerfully determine the extent to which situations are just. The currency of 
welfare embraces non-material benefits and harms, but suffers from the “cheap and expensive 
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tastes” problem, in which the differing welfare functions of individuals make it so that different 
amounts of resources must be spent on them in order to enable them to arrive at equivalent levels 
of welfare. The distributions of wealth and resources arising from a solely welfare-centric system 
of justice seem likely to be both unjustly unequal and, furthermore, difficult to assign: are people 
simply to be believed, for instance, when they claim that they require more resources than their 
neighbors in order to match them in welfare?193 The currency of opportunity for welfare 
neutralizes the “cheap and expensive tastes” objections by shifting its focus from increasing 
welfare to increasing individuals’ chances for welfare, which are bound to be easier to identify 
and distribute without bias than welfare itself. However, as I have said, opportunity of welfare 
does not—cannot—describe in any greater specificity than welfare did what welfare actually 
consists of. Consequently, it too is unacceptably ambiguous about the stuff of justice to be of use 
for determinations about just long-term climate solutions. 
 The three more sophisticated currencies I have discussed—Rawls’s social primary goods, 
Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities, and Barry’s “vital interests”—all make valuable contributions 
to our understanding of justice. Rawls argues for a clear and reasonably tangible index of goods 
with which to weigh justice, in rejection of the idea that just distributions may occur through 
“unguided intuition” alone.194 He persuasively contends that justice must assign to people basic 
rights, liberties, opportunities, and access to institutions as well as basic material goods. Sen and 
Nussbam find this more layered index of “social primary goods” agreeable, but argue that Rawls 
is mistaken in believing these goods to be ends in themselves, rather than (as they contend) 
necessary means to the ultimate end of capability fulfillment. Though I believe Sen and 
Nussbaum are correct to emphasize capability fulfillment—and though I argue that it is most 
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appropriate to adopt this currency for tasks of relatively near-term humanitarian relief, including 
climate adaptation assistance—I believe nonetheless that a focus on capabilities alone can be of 
little use to planners concerned about protecting the future world from the impacts of climate 
change. These planners’ responsibility is to ensure that future generations receive the tangible 
resources, institutions, and social traditions that will require to enjoy capability-filled lives—not 
to deliver the capabilities themselves, which can only be realized in vivid detail once these future 
peoples have come into being.  
 Rawls’s social primary goods—an index of resources and institutions specified 
concretely enough to provide “objective grounds” for evaluating justice, but also generally 
enough to be of service to all people, regardless of their conceptions of the good—would be 
perfect for such considerations about the long-term impacts of climate change were it not so 
vaguely and distantly connected to the real-world harms climate change is producing. Brian 
Barry improves upon the objective of the social primary goods by considering the ways in which 
climate change threatens such general goods and adopting “vital” human needs—for 
nourishment and education, for example—as the criterion by which to include goods and 
institutions in his index of justice. In this way, Barry refines the appropriately general currency 
of the social primary goods through a humanitarian, capabilities-oriented emphasis on “vital 
interests.” Simultaneously, he explicitly links his hybrid of Rawls’ and Sen and Nussbaum’s 
currencies to the challenges of long-term environmental change, contending that environmental 
harm is wrong insofar as it threatens the general sets of resources and institutions that future 
people will need to live decent lives—in other words, their “vital interests.” 
 In summary, the challenges of climate justice are best considered using currencies that 
vary with temporal scale. At the microscopic scale of climate adaptation, which seeks to help 
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people cope with immediate climate impacts, Sen and Nussbaum’s currency of capabilities is 
most appropriate, since it ensures the level of consideration for varying cultural and individual 
needs that is necessary for such assistance to do its job. At the more macroscopic level of climate 
change mitigation, which seeks to prevent potential climate impacts from occurring in the first 
place, Barry’s more material currency of “vital interests” (which, again, consists of minor 
revisions to Rawls’s social primary goods) is most appropriate. Indeed, the present can only 
guarantee the capabilities of future people by ensuring that they inherit the tangible of resources, 
institutions, and traditions they will need to fulfill these capabilities for themselves (or that their 
governments or other social institutions will need to fulfill the capabilities for them). Barry’s 
currency coheres best with this reality—better than social primary goods, which is too vague, 
and better than capabilities, which deals poorly with the limits on the present’s ability to 
guarantee capability fulfillment for future peoples. 
 
1. The lingering challenge of harm 
In my critique of the simple currency of resources, I observed that biophysical harms, not just 
shortages of resources and institutions, characterize the way in which climate change undermines 
intergenerational justice. Harms are well accounted for by the capabilities approach of Sen and 
Nussbaum, which I have claimed to be the most appropriate currency for considering climate 
justice at the microscopic level of mitigation: Nussbaum’s index of the basic capabilities 
includes both “life” (specifically, “not dying prematurely”) and “bodily health.”195 According to 
this index, justice is violated when human-induced climate change impacts kill, sicken, or injure 
human beings. 
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 At the more macroscopic level of mitigation, however, climate harms are not so well 
accounted for. Rawls and Barry’s currencies are appealing for the task of weighing climatic 
obligations between generations because their contents, which include resources, liberties, 
institutions, and traditions, are clear and reasonably tangible. Consequently, they enable us to 
take a straightforward view of what precisely is unjust about human-induced climate change: it 
threatens the resources, liberties, institutions, and traditions that people need and will need in 
order to lead decent, capability-filled lives.   
Harm, however, is not captured in Rawls or Barry’s currency in the neat and tangible way 
that resources, institutions, and the like are. As I alluded in my critique of basic resourcism, one 
cannot simply argue that climatically-induced harm is unjust because it threatens the ability of 
future generations to enjoy the resources, institutions, and practices that comprise Barry’s “vital 
interests.” This is for the simple reason that climatic harms, such as heat waves and sudden 
floods, often harm people quite directly, in ways that have less to do with threats to quantifiable, 
tangible goods (however broadly defined) than with bodily trauma. 
Neither can one argue, from the perspective of the present-day policymaker seeking to 
justly balance the interests of her contemporaries with those of future generations, that climatic 
harm is unjust because it threatens future opportunities for capability fulfillment. Such an 
argument would smack strongly of the “unguided intuition” of which Rawls is so wary.196 
Indeed, though it is clearly true that climatic harm threatens the fulfillment of capabilities— 
namely “life” and “bodily integrity,” following Nussbaum’s index197—stating this as fact does 
not provide any basis for weighing present and future advantages and disadvantages. (Except, 
perhaps, through a direct numerical comparison of the lives being preserved in the present 
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through sustained carbon-intensive economic activity and the number of lives expected to be lost 
to climatically exacerbated biophysical harm over the course of the future as a result of this 
carbon-intensive activity. I assume such a comparison would be technically impossible to 
execute, given the massive number of assumptions that would have to be adopted for the 
production of “lives preserved/lost” numbers to be compared against each other. I also believe 
such a comparison would, as a simple form of utilitarianism, be incompatible with any serious 
effort to compare preserved and lost political liberties and other not-so-quantifiable 
considerations.) 
A simple potential solution for addressing climatic harm within the framework of Barry’s 
“vital interests” is to define “safety” as one of the vital interests, and to provide for “climate 
safety” through the use of defined per-capita shares of the global atmospheric commons that 
people can safely fill with greenhouse gases. In doing so, we would begin by determining a 
degree of climate change for which we believe we can adapt to and ultimately tolerate the 
associated damages to human life and health—including both expected biophysical harm from 
hurricanes and other climatically exacerbated disasters and damages to such original “vital 
interest” goods as clean drinking water. This is a tremendously complex task, and one that I 
cannot describe in detail in this paper. For the purposes of the current argument, it suffices to say 
that the European Union and a range of scientific bodies believe we must limit global warming to 
about 3.5º F beyond pre-industrial levels if “worst impacts” are to be avoided. This figure 
corresponds—roughly, and relatively uncertainly—with a stabilization of atmospheric carbon 
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dioxide (and carbon dioxide equivalent) concentrations at about 450 parts per million by 2025.198 
199
The next step, after selecting a stabilization target, would be to develop annual carbon 
dioxide and carbon dioxide equivalent emissions targets consistent with the goal of stabilization, 
and to divide these targets into per-capita targets. As Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain note, the 
IPCC has estimated that the world must limit its carbon dioxide emissions to between 5.73 and 
5.91 billion tons (GtC) annually if it is to achieve the 450 ppm stabilization goal, taking into 
account the greenhouse gases that the Earth’s oceans, soils, and organisms absorb naturally each 
year—a range would have “provided in 1990 a per capita entitlement of 1.08-1.12 [tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalents]”per year.200 Such a per capita entitlement to the atmospheric 
commons could be added to the set of “vital interests,” providing an objective framework for 
evaluating present and future climate risk.  
This move is appealing because it captures the likely present and future harms associated 
with unchecked climate change within an objective, distributable allotment of the atmospheric 
commons, which can be handled much in the way that “vital interests” like water, arable land, 
and institutions (be they hospitals or freedom-enabling government offices) are handled. If an 
individual or a nation emits more carbon dioxide and carbon dioxide equivalents per year than 
his or its per-capita allotment allows, it may be said that this individual or nation is acting 
beyond the threshold of climate safety—a vital interest of present and future peoples—and thus 
violating justice. 
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The move is appealing for two additional reasons: first, it expresses the oft-unstated truth 
that access to fuel for warmth and transportation is itself a vital interest, quite apart from climate 
safety, and that such access frequently implies greenhouse gas emissions. And second, it clearly 
marks out the difference between such “subsistence emissions” and “luxury emissions,”201 thus 
compelling a consideration of the distributive patterns that mark our current use of the 
atmospheric commons. These patterns are troubling indeed: as of 2002, the average American 
emitted five tons of carbon dioxide and its equivalents each year,202 nearly five times the 1990 
per-capita allotment referred to previously, and more than 100 times the annual emissions of the 
average Bangladeshi.203) 
The currency of intergenerational climate justice is now specified, and a solution to the 
problem of accounting for climatic harm proposed. The coming section examines the cyclone 
that struck Burma in May 2008, providing real-world evidence of the need to model preparations 
for and responses to climate change’s effects on a sophisticated, rather than a simple, currency of 








E. Cyclone Nargis: a case study in currency 
                                                 
201 Shue, op. cit., pp. 449-459. 
202 Agarwal and Narain, op. cit., p. 4. 
203 Ibid., p. 3. 
 92
Few would disagree that clean drinking water and the means and conditions to produce 
food and other physical necessities belong among the vital interests that, as I have argued, best 
specify the currency of intergenerational climate justice at the macroscopic level of mitigation. 
And few would disagree that, at the more microscopic level of adaptation, nourishment is among 
the chief human capabilities about which we should be concerned when considering the effects 
of climate change. 
 More controversial, I imagine, is the contention that political rights and liberties are 
critical components of the currency of intergenerational climate justice. I believe they are, and in 
this section I support my belief with the example of Burma, where the cascade of death set off in 
May by Cyclone Nargis has been severely exacerbated by a lack of political rights and liberties 
among the country’s citizens. 
 On May 2, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma, flooding the low-lying 
Irrawaddy Delta and drowning tens of thousands of people almost immediately.204 In the days 
and months following the disaster, the Burmese military junta proved unwilling either to respond 
adequately to the needs of its citizens, or (perhaps more problematically) to allow other entities 
to respond where it refused to. Out of paranoia about the possibility of foreign interference in its 
internal affairs, the junta denied many foreign aid workers visas, ordered foreign volunteers 
already in the country to leave well before the humanitarian crisis had subsided, and denied 
American cargo ships bearing food, water, and medical supplies the permits they needed to dock 
and deliver their loads.205 All the while, the junta failed to provide meaningful assistance of its 
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own, despite claiming to be engaged in “prompt work” to give adequate aid to “all citizens.”206 
In view of these abuses, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates accused the junta of “criminal 
neglect” on Sunday, June 1, 2008.207 Since the cyclone struck the Irrawaddy Delta on May 2 and 
3, about 140,000 Burmese citizens have died or gone missing.208 A great many of these deaths 
have occurred as a result of water-borne illnesses that might well have been prevented by a more 
serious governmental commitment to repairing water infrastructure and administering emergency 
vaccinations.209
 What exactly was unjust about Cyclone Nargis and its aftermath, in the context of the 
currencies of intergenerational climate justice outlined previously? I believe the injustices of 
Cyclone Nargis occurred at a number of levels, some obvious, some less obvious. In the 
following paragraphs I analyze the more obviously unjust features of humankind’s involvement 
in Cyclone Nargis. I then use these features as a springboard for considering the deeper injustices 
associated with Burma’s poor political and social institutions, which I believe led quite 
systematically to the immediately apparent injustices of the cyclone. 
 
1. Categorizing the obvious 
The most obviously unjust feature of the events immediately following Cyclone Nargis, I 
believe, was the failure of the humanitarian response to protect people’s basic capabilities—
especially life and bodily health, in the phrasing of Martha Nussbaum210—in the days, weeks, 
and months following the cyclone. But it must be asked: was this failure a failure of climate 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Human Rights Watch staff, “Burma: Cyclone Donors Should Ensure Transparency and Accountability,” from the 
website of Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2008, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/07/23/burma19442.htm. 
209 Saw Yan Naing, “Residents Say 22 Villages Destroyed in Laputta Township,” The Irrawaddy, May 6, 2008, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=11793. 
210 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, cited in Jan Garrett, “Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights,” 
Western Kentucky University Working Papers, 2008, http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum.htm. 
 94
justice? I believe the answer is yes. One cannot say conclusively whether human contributions to 
the greenhouse effect caused Cyclone Nargis. What one can say is that science has predicted 
continual warming-driven increases in the intensity and duration of such cyclones,211 and that a 
certain portion of the devastation that occurs as a result of each contemporary cyclone is 
attributable to human-induced climate change. Thus Cyclone Nargis was, to some extent, a 
climate impact, and the Burmese military junta’s inadequate response to it was, to a similar 
extent, a failure of climate justice.  
As I have argued, the junta’s failure is best characterized as a failure to protect human 
capabilities. As I have also argued, the language of capabilities is best suited to weighing justice 
at the level of climate adaptation. This connection seems to hold in the case of Cyclone Nargis: 
inadequate adaptation assistance was the most striking injustice of the period during and 
following the cyclone, and characterizing just adaptation as something like resources—that is, as 
something other than the fulfillment and protection of basic capabilities, which I regard as the 
proper measure of just adaptation—might have allowed us to classify inappropriate aid efforts 
(like the canned pork that made its way to Muslim communities in Aceh, Indonesia following the 
2004 tsunami) as acts of perfect justice.  
Though the aforementioned failures of climate adaptation were the most visible and 
tangible injustices of the period during and following Cyclone Nargis, I believe we must assume 
that unjust failures of climate mitigation occurred as well. Science tells us that human-induced 
climate change is making hurricanes and cyclones longer and more intense.212 So while Cyclone 
Nargis might have happened even without human contributions to climate change, it most likely 
would not have been as long or as destructive as it was. The currency of vital interests seems to 
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best capture the sense in which this (likely) human exacerbation of the cyclone was unjust, at the 
macroscopic level of mitigation. 
Brian Barry includes “adequate nutrition, clean drinking water, clothing and housing… 
[and] health care” in his list of vital interests for living, though he emphasizes that these are not 
the only vital interests.213 It would be possible to account for a large portion of the injustice that 
occurred as a result of the cyclone in Burma through the lens of these stated vital interests. 
Indeed, since the cyclone struck, many have perished because of lack of clean drinking water. 
One might therefore argue that the people who exacerbated Cyclone Nargis by emitting 
greenhouse gases (which is to say, you and me) deprived Burmese victims of clean water—a 
preventable and unjust deprivation, since the destruction of water infrastructure and 
encroachment of saline ocean water on fresh drinking water supplies are known to go hand in 
hand with many climate impacts, including cyclones and hurricanes. 
At the level of mitigation, however, the injustice of Cyclone Nargis is not fully captured 
in terms of deprivations of clean drinking water and other purely “material” vital interests. Many 
Burmese citizens also died directly from the physical violences of the cyclone—from sudden 
drowning floods, and from ferocious winds that sent projectiles flying and caused houses to 
collapse. Some way of accounting for harm is therefore also necessary if the injustice of the 
storm is to be accurately accounted for. As I have said, the vital interest of a capped per-capita 
share of the atmospheric commons internalizes climate harm, which would be largely or 
completely avoided if every human being kept his or her annual personal emissions below such a 
common threshold. We are well aware that many of the world’s people—in particular 
Americans—emit far more than any workable international emissions threshold allows, and that 
they have been doing so for many years, driving the rate at which the world collectively emits to 
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dangerous and ever-rising highs. We must assume, then, that the severity and length of Cyclone 
Nargis, and thus its immediate physical impacts on human beings, would have been lesser if 
certain people had not previously violated vital interests in this way.  
 The most immediate senses in which people added injustice to the events of Cyclone 
Nargis are now specified. At the level of adaptation, injustice consisted in the Burmese military 
junta’s failure to help people to maintain and/or recover their basic human capabilities, especially 
life and bodily health. At the level of mitigation, “excess emitters” contributed more than they 
should have to the greenhouse effect, thus triggering a more or less predictable series of physical 
harms at various points in the future, including (it is only sensible to say) some measure of the 
harm that came with Cyclone Nargis. 
 
2. Institutional failures 
 In a previous section about Brian Barry’s elaborations on the Rawlsian currency of social 
primary goods, I cited the right to receive disaster relief from a reasonably responsive 
government as one example of the “rights, liberties, and opportunities” Rawls includes in his 
currency of justice. This is a right most Burmese citizens clearly did not enjoy in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis. Here a crucial question arises: why was the Burmese military junta so 
unresponsive to its citizens in their time of need? The answer reveals a deeper set of injustices 
that, although not often considered in the context of climate change, bore heavily on the success 
of climate adaptation in the case of Cyclone Nargis. 
The Burmese military junta has reigned since 1962, when the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP) toppled the country’s democratically elected parliament under the 
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direction of Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win.214 Widespread anti-junta demonstrations and 
the subsequent installment of Dr. Maung Maung, a civilian, as president offered proponents of 
democracy a glimmer of hope in August 1988.215 But the military quickly crushed these 
demonstrations and replaced Maung Maung and his newly reformed BSPP with the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which renamed itself the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) in 1997.216 The SPDC remains in power today. 
The anti-government protests of late 2007, which began in August after the SPDC 
removed a long-standing subsidy that caused the price of natural gas to quintuple and the price of 
gasoline to double,217 provoked a murderous crackdown by the military junta.218  This sparked 
an international outcry that grew louder as the junta’s abuses of protesting Buddhist monks 
became more apparent.219 The international response propelled junta officials into a state of high 
alert about the possibility of foreign intervention, somewhat in recollection of the 1988 protests, 
during which the United States terrified Burma’s military government by sending an aircraft 
carrier into the Bay of Bengal to help evacuate foreign nationals.220  
It was against this backdrop of inward strife and outward paranoia that Cyclone Nargis 
struck Burma. The hard-hit Irrawaddy Delta, a historic home to the Karen people and other 
marginalized ethnic minorities, was and is far from the seat of governmental power in 
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Rangoon.221 It received almost no governmental assistance prior to the cyclone, enjoying only 
what minimal infrastructure its residents could build for themselves.222 This neglect made the 
Irrawaddy Delta socially and physically vulnerable to natural disasters early on. Prior to the 
cyclone, it was reported that only one fully qualified doctor resided in the primary hospital of 
Laputta223—a southwestern Delta township that originally contained 350,000 people, and which 
(according to local sources) saw the total destruction of 22 different villages and the death of 
60,000 people within just a few days of the cyclone’s landing.224 The shoddiness of the 
Irrawaddy Delta’s physical infrastructure before the cyclone impelled the World Health 
Organization’s Debarati Guha-Sapir to remark that “the villages are in such levels of 
desperation—housing quality, nutritional status, roads, bridges, dams—that losses were more 
determined by their condition rather than the force of [Cyclone Nargis].”225  
 
3. Representation as a vital interest for living 
 In “Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice,” Brian Barry states that the purpose of 
the vital interests is to ensure that human beings are “able to live healthy lives, raise families, 
work at full capacity, and take a part in social and political life,” thereby assigning social and 
political life a measure of intrinsic value.226 I do not disagree with this assessment. But I believe 
the case of Burma illustrates that active political life are often also fundamental prerequisites for 
access to seemingly more “basic” vital interests like clean drinking water, food, and healthcare. 
Therefore, I believe we must regard social and political rights as being just as “basic,” just as 
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223 Ibid. 
224 Saw Yan Naing, op. cit. 
225 Andrew Revkin, “The Dangers of the Deltas,” New York Times, May 11, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/weekinreview/11revkin.html. 
226 Italics added for emphasis. Barry, op. cit., p. 97. 
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“vital,” as the vital interests that comprise Barry’s (and, at the macroscopic scale of mitigation, 
my) currency of intergenerational climate justice. The Burmese residents of the Irrawaddy Delta 
did not enjoy fulfilling political lives either prior to or during Cyclone Nargis, and they do not 
enjoy them now. The governmental neglect that went and continues to go unchecked as a result 
of this lack of political life has wrought deadly, devastating consequences on the Burmese. So 
political rights, liberties, and opportunities—the staples of any fulfilling political life—must also 
somehow be a part of the package of “vital interests.” The writings of John Rawls provide some 
preliminary guidance about the form these staples might take as components of the currency of 
intergenerational climate justice. 
 As I have mentioned before, “rights, liberties, and opportunities” comprise one major 
category of Rawls’s currency of social primary goods.227 But from the perspective of present 
individuals seeking to determine what they owe to people in the relatively distant future—the 
temporal scale at which, I have argued, the matter of climate change mitigation is most salient—
it may seem bewildering to speak of “rights, liberties, and opportunities,” since it is not 
immediately apparent how the present should go about passing rights (for example) into the 
future. Rawls is cognizant of this difficulty, writing in a passage about the just savings principle 
and the intergenerational obligations it contains that “each generation must… maintain intact 
those just institutions that have been established.”228 Rawls, it seems, identifies institutions as the 
proper vehicles for the long-term preservation of rights, liberties, and opportunities. I believe his 
approach is indisputably logical. 
 But what kinds of institutions are we to consider just and therefore worthy of 
preservation? Rawls’s writings in The Law of Peoples shed some light on the matter. Here, 
                                                 
227 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 80. 
228 Ibid. p. 254. 
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Rawls classifies both liberal democracies and “decent hierarchical societies” as “well-ordered 
peoples.” To qualify as a “decent hierarchical society,” a society must exhibit concern for the 
“human rights” of all its constituent groups.229 It must also possess a reasonably responsive 
“consultation hierarchy” through which groups that do not enjoy full political representation can 
channel their requests and complaints.230 (Here the proviso “reasonably responsive” indicates 
that a people’s consultation hierarchy must link up with a state apparatus on which marginalized 
groups can rely for support and relief.) This is not a point I wish to revisit in detail here; my 
point is rather to recall that Rawls approves, at some level, of both liberal democracies and 
decent hierarchical societies.  
Can the institutions of liberal democracies and decent hierarchical societies be counted on 
to provide future individuals with adequate protection and relief in the face of climate impacts 
like Cyclone Nargis? Are they, more pointedly, worth preserving as components of the currency 
of vital interests? These questions are answerable only on a case-by-case basis. Hurricane 
Katrina revealed that even the institutions of liberal democracies can badly neglect the needs of 
citizens during times of crisis. And the relatively advanced climate adaptation initiatives of 
Egypt, which is acutely vulnerable to global warming-induced sea level rise,231 demonstrate that 
even executive-dominated, quasi-democratic states232 with histories of neglecting minority 
groups233 are capable of mounting laudable efforts to protect their citizens into the climatically 
burdened future. What the case of Burma makes clear, however, is that societies which deny 
their citizens all opportunities for meaningful political participation are susceptible to critical 
                                                 
229 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 109. 
230 Ibid., p. 72. 
231 Mohammed El Raey, Khalid Dewidar, and Mohammed El Hattab, “Adaptation to the Impacts of Sea Level Rise 
in Egypt,” Climate Research , 12, August 27, 1999, pp. 117-128. 
232 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Egypt,” from the website of the 
U.S. Department of State, 2008, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm. 
233 Human Rights Watch staff, “Egypt: Human Rights Background,” from the website of Human Rights Watch, 
October 2001, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt-bck-1001.htm. 
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failures of climate adaptation and disaster relief. Such dearths of political participation render 
governments deaf to the needs of their people. 
As a general means of determining whether an institution is effective and reliable enough 
to qualify as a component of the intergenerational currency of vital interests, I recommend once 
again the evaluative framework provided by Rawls’s original position. If an institution’s climate 
adaptation services are so effective at protecting the vital interests of an entire society in times of 
crisis that representatives of all of the society’s groups would agree to the long-term use of the 
institution in the original position, then it seems we would be correct to preserve the institution 
as a component of our currency of intergenerational climate justice. If not, our challenge would 
be to reform or replace the institution until it, or its successor, meets this criterion. 
Such processes of reform (or, as the case may be, replacement) do not often take place 
overnight; the roots of appropriate, need-satisfying institutional responses to disaster can extend 
into distant history. (The same is true of inappropriate responses, as the Burmese military junta’s 
46-year history of oppression and neglect illustrates.) It would be incorrect to speak of climate 
adaptation as a solely short-term pursuit of intergenerational climate justice, just as it would be 
incorrect to speak of vital interests as a solely long-term means of ensuring it. The time required 
to build institutions capable of carrying out adequate climate adaptation links present-day 














A. Closing remarks 
 
“We don’t have any throw away resources. We don’t have a throw away species. We don’t have 
any throw away children. No. It’s all sacred.”       
                     —Van Jones234
 
Discussions of what is practical and discussions of what is ethical do not always cohere. To 
practically minded individuals, ethics may sometimes seem like an imaginary and unrealizable 
set of strictures. To the ethically minded, the routines and practices of the world may appear 
monstrous. 
 Like the Van Jones quotation recited above, the principal arguments of this thesis have 
been unabashedly ethical. In making them, I have not proposed innovative climate policy 
mechanisms, nor pioneered new technologies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, I 
have attempted to add to the small but growing ethical guidebook that I believe must steer such 
practical climate solutions. I have focused in particular on the segment of this guidebook that 
extends forward into time, expanding and improving on the moral case for intergenerational 
climate justice.  
 At the end of my introductory section, I explained the general ethical approach that my 
subsequent chapters employ in distinguishing justice from injustice: the original position of John 
Rawls. 
 In Chapter One, I sketched some of the contours of Earth’s conceivable climate futures, 
demonstrating that the present generation possesses considerable (though by no means absolute) 
power to determine which future becomes reality. I also emphasized that a measure of human-
                                                 
234 See Anna Fahey, “A Green Wave Shall Lift All Boats, Says Van Jones,” from the website of Sightline Daily, 
November 9, 2007, http://daily.sightline.org/daily_score/archive/2007/11/09/Van-Jones. 
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induced climate change is now unavoidable, providing grounds for my recurring claim that 
adaptation to the impacts of this climate change is as much a requirement of justice as mitigation. 
 In Chapter Two, I added to the existing ethical basis for including all subsequent 
generations, and all the people of the contemporary world, in the scope of climate justice. I 
proposed modifications to the intergenerational and international justice provisions of John 
Rawls—namely, the just savings principle and the duty of assistance—in an effort both to help 
these provisions protect a wider range of people throughout time and space, and to make the 
provisions more robust and appealing from the standpoint of rational self-interest. At the end of 
the chapter, I provided an ethical examination of the practice of discounting, which I determined 
to be almost totally inconsistent with the universal scope of intergenerational climate justice I 
outlined earlier. 
 In Chapter Three, I dug through some common ideas about the actual contents (or 
currency) of justice, revealing their inadequacies in the face of long-term climate change. I then 
crafted a hybrid of two more sophisticated notions of the currency of justice—Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities and Brian Barry’s very Rawlsian vital interests—in an effort to 
improve our understanding of what precisely is unjust about failures of climate mitigation and 
climate adaptation. I used this hybrid conception, this ethical pair of bifocals,235 to analyze the 
natural and social catastrophe of Cyclone Nargis, which has directly or indirectly killed more 
than 140,000 Burmese citizens since striking southeast Asia last May. This tragedy, I 
determined, provides real-world evidence of the need to consider political rights, institutions, and 
opportunities (in addition to more obviously necessary goods and resources like food and water) 
as threads in the fabric of intergenerational climate justice. 
                                                 
235 See Chapter Three, “Misreadings: reconciling currencies of justice in the immediate and distant future,” p. 81. 
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 Tapping out these closing sentences, I cannot help but notice the sounds of the cars, 
trucks, and SUVs that travel ceaselessly along the major suburban artery near my house. I cannot 
help but be reminded of the formidable gap that exists between the idealistic ethical guideposts I 
have sought to erect here and the many senseless, polluting, comparatively unethical practices 
and institutions of our contemporary society. Other authors have considered this disconnect as 
well; some, like Peter Laslett and James Fishkin,236 and Bjorn Lomborg,237 have interpreted it to 
mean that the flaws lie with the ethics as well as with the practices. I disagree with them. Ethical 
principles, I believe, should emerge from ethical arguments like the ones I have tried to provide 
in this paper, not from claims about what is currently possible. If our practices fail to cohere with 
our ethics, and if our ethics rest on rational foundations, logic compels us only to revise our 
practices—not the other way around. 
 The Van Jones quotation referenced a few pages earlier may seem brash to some. The 
notion of having no more children and no more generations to expend implies a need for radical 
changes to our individual and collective behaviors. But this does not make the notion wrong; 
                                                 
236 Laslett and Fishkin begin their introductory chapter to Justice Between Age Groups and Generations with a 
dreary observation about the range of beneficiaries that intergenerational environmental justice can practically 
embrace: 
 …we start with what looks to be a defensible principle of justice over time… [under which] every member 
 of every generation must have equal access to the resources of the world, quite irrespective of the 
 generation to which he or she was, is, or will be born. We find, however, that a limit has to be set to the 
 number of generations that we can take into account, because if we allow the series to be open-ended and 
 therefore potentially infinite, we meet with absurdity forthwith. This is because the resources of the human 
 world, social, political, and material, cannot themselves possibly be infinite… a finite quantity divided by 
 an infinite number must have a zero result—[meaning] no one gets anything at any time.” 
Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, “Introduction,” Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, eds. Peter Laslett 
and James Fishkin, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 6. 
237 Lomborg writes: 
 …it’s tempting for us to say we should [focus our efforts on ameliorating both climate change and more 
 ‘immediate’ problems like hunger and disease]. Morally, that seems compelling. But the truth is that’s 
 not realistic. The world lacks the resources and the will to solve all its major challenges… 
 …This is the real moral problem of the global warming argument—it means well, but by almost 
 expropriating the public agenda, trying to address the hardest problem,  with the highest price tag and the 
 least chance of success, it leaves little space, attention, and money for smarter and more realistic 
 solutions. 
Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2007, pp. 46-47 and p. 123. 
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indeed, as I have demonstrated through the arguments of this thesis, it is ethically quite correct. 
Today, as passing hurricanes fizzle, as new ones gather, and as old resource conflicts grow hotter 
for our emissions and our neglect, Jones’s brashness seems consistent with the bold new work 
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